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A Nation of Informants
REINING IN POST-9/11 COERCION OF
INTELLIGENCE INFORMANTS
Diala Shamas†
Every person enjoys some measure of protection against being coerced
into cooperating with law enforcement authorities by governmental
techniques of intimidation and harassment.1

INTRODUCTION
Muhammad Tanvir was working at a “99 Cents” store in
Queens, New York, when Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
agents approached him and asked him to work as an informant.
Specifically, they wanted him to spy on the local Muslim
community, without any particular target. Mr. Tanvir saw no
reason to get involved, and he had a number of reservations: he
had no knowledge of any unlawful activities; he did not need
anything from the FBI; he was concerned about the dangers
inherent to working as an informant, and spying on his
community went against his religious beliefs. As a result, he
declined the agents’ repeated, and increasingly aggressive
overtures. Months later, he was not permitted to board a flight
to visit his ailing mother in Pakistan. When he called the FBI to
complain, they told him he would not be permitted to travel until
he agreed to work with them.2
† Staff Attorney, the Center for Constitutional Rights. This article draws on
my work and clients’ experiences as a supervising attorney at the CLEAR (Creating Law
Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility) project at CUNY School of Law, where I
represented a number of individuals who were recruited to become informants, and
experienced the practices that I explore more fully in this article. I am grateful to Amna
Akbar, Chesa Boudin, Catherine Grosso, Babe Howell, Ramzi Kassem, Darryl Li,
Alexandra Natapoff, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Yaman Salahi, Shirin Sinnar, and David
Sklansky for their comments on earlier drafts, and to Naz Ahmad, Nermeen Arastu and
Tarek Ismail for their insightful conversations. I also benefitted from the meticulous
editing of the Brooklyn Law Review team. Any mistakes are my own.
1 Angola v. Civiletti, 666 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1981).
2 First Amended Complaint at 2, Tanvir v. Lynch, 128 F. Supp. 3d 756
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d in part sub nom. Tanvir v. Tanzin, 889 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2018) (No.
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FBI agents wanted Yassine Ouassif to regularly report
what his friends were saying at the mosque he attended in
Sacramento, California. When he refused, the agents threatened
to take away his green card and deport him, even though it later
became clear they would have had no lawful basis to do so.3
Mr. Tanvir and Mr. Ouassif’s experiences are not
isolated. They are illustrative of FBI efforts to recruit
informants for intelligence gathering purposes. Since at least
the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has
engaged in widespread surveillance of Muslim-American
communities, including the monitoring of Muslim organizations,
religious spaces, neighborhoods, activities and online forums. To
operationalize such initiatives, the government relies heavily on
recruiting members of those communities as informants. Lawabiding individuals with no prior criminal record make desirable
recruits, given their ability to be inconspicuous, and their
possession of the linguistic or cultural knowledge of the targeted
communities. They are not, however, as vulnerable to traditional
criminal-informant-pressuring methods, which are typically
effectuated through the criminal process. The stated lawenforcement need for information from members of MuslimAmerican communities at large has resulted in a turn towards
the No-Fly List and immigration processes, such as withholding
or delaying immigration benefits from otherwise eligible
applicants, as recruiting tools. As executive authority over
immigration and travel continues to expand with minimal
recourse to judicial oversight, it is increasingly important to
examine the rights implicated by these recruitment efforts.
This article examines the legal and regulatory
framework governing post-September 11 informant recruitment
practices. It shows how existing, albeit limited,4 safeguards that
deter law enforcement misconduct during the informant
recruitment process—whether it is the possibility of exclusion of
unlawfully obtained evidence, the promise of a public trial, or
the fear of unreliable evidence—do not apply to a large segment
of FBI informants. This leaves informant recruitment efforts in
the counterterrorism arena virtually unregulated, unrestrained,
and with limited avenues for judicial oversight. Individuals like
Mr. Tanvir and Mr. Ouassif thus lack protections from
13-CV-6951), ECF No. 15. Note: I represented Mr. Tanvir and the other plaintiffs in
Tanvir v. Lynch.
3 See Peter Waldman, A Muslim’s Choice: Turn U.S. Informant or Risk
Losing Visa, WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB115258258431002991 [https://perma.cc/8PNW-L5M6].
4 See infra Part IV for details about the limits of those safeguards.
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government overreach. In light of the turn towards intelligence
gathering and away from traditional law enforcement tactics in
the counterterrorism context, even the most ambitious proposals
for reform leave a growing pool of potential informants at the
whim of law enforcement agents.
Currently, unfettered access to a growing arsenal of noncriminal coercive measures allows the government to exert
pressure over a vast swath of the Muslim-American population,
implicating significant rights. Although the practice is currently
focused on Muslim-Americans, it is establishing a precedent that
can and may be expanded to other groups as law enforcement
priorities shift.
The following analysis of informant recruitment takes as
a starting point the experiences of the communities and
individuals targeted for this recruitment. Their stories animate
the inquiry into the relevant governing standards and
regulations, and highlight significant gaps in the existing
protections. Part I presents the ways in which informants are
used in terrorism investigations and surfaces distinctions
between criminal informants and intelligence informants. The
intelligence informant, or the “Muslim informant,” is more
informal than the criminal one, and is primarily situated outside
the criminal process. Part II describes the move towards noncriminal levers for recruitment, and looks at two particularly
well-documented forms of pressure: placement on the No-Fly
List, and the withholding of immigration benefits. Both forms of
pressure present transparency and due process concerns, and
grant significant discretion to individual FBI agents, making the
techniques prone to abuse. Part III raises the significant legal
and societal concerns implicated by coercion of intelligence
informants, taking the First Amendment as a focal point of
inquiry. This Part underscores the core democratic principle at
stake as we move towards a system that leaves unchecked the
state’s ability to force whole segments of its population—anyone
with a pending immigration matter or a need to travel—to spy
on each other. Part IV examines the legal and regulatory limits
on law enforcement agents’ recruitment practices. This review
concludes that regulatory restrictions on coercive recruitment of
intelligence informants are thin. Whatever limited protections
exist are rooted in the criminal framework and driven primarily
by anti-corruption and evidentiary concerns—they are thus
unavailable to intelligence informants. Part V makes several
proposals that would expand available protections to reflect this
new reality.
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THE “MUSLIM VERSION” OF THE INFORMANT EXPERIENCE

The identification and recruitment of informants has
long been a central part of the law enforcement toolbox,5 but the
use of informants has steadily grown over time.6 Especially since
the attacks of September 11, law enforcement agencies have
redoubled their efforts to recruit informants,7 resulting in a
“Muslim version” of the American informant experience.
According to the most recent available numbers, the FBI
formally counts 15,000 informants among its rolls.8 The
numbers are even higher than these formally recognized
informants, as they don’t count informal, intelligence
informants: the individuals who are tapped for information on a
daily basis, usually through the use of coercive measures.9 These
individuals—“intelligence informants”—and their recruitment
by the FBI are the focus of this article.
The term “informant” could include any civilian who
provides information to the police.10 This could be an accomplice,
5 See generally STEVE HEWITT, SNITCH! A HISTORY OF THE MODERN
INTELLIGENCE INFORMER 158, n.103 (2010); Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of
Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L. J. 1091 (1951).
6 FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY UNDERCOVER ACTIVITIES
OF COMPONENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, S. REP. NO. 97-682, at 6 n.20 (1982) (noting
the increasing reliance of various law enforcement agencies on undercover operations,
including informants), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/124269NCJRS.pdf.
7 In the immediate aftermath of September 11, there was a call for intelligence
agencies to recruit individuals with the cultural and linguistic knowledge that’s shared
with the terrorist organizations. See, e.g., Jonathan Freedland, Use Brains, Not Brawn,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2002, 8:25 PM EST), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/dec/04/
military.world [https://perma.cc/GN84-E255]; Andrew Roberts, Bring Back 007,
SPECTATOR (Oct. 6, 2001), http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/6th-october-2001/20/bringback-007 [https://perma.cc/SLT6-FT6J]. This expansion is consistent with historical
precedents: as law enforcement priorities shift, new groups find themselves in the
crosshairs of law enforcement attention. Because investigating agencies do not already
have officers within their ranks to investigate or surveil the new target community, the
agencies seek informers who can play the part. HEWITT, supra note 5, at 124–25 (“[T]he
larger the difference between an investigating agency and those being investigated, the
greater the need for informers.”).
8 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FY 2008
AUTHORIZATION AND BUDGET REQUEST TO CONGRESS at 4–23, https://www.document
cloud.org/documents/238034-33-fbi-se-2.html#document/p38/a30817 [https://perma.cc/TB798BVZ]; NPR Staff, Terror Probes Have FBI’s Informant Numbers Soaring, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Aug. 21, 2011, 5:10 EST), https://www.npr.org/2011/08/21/139836377/the-surgein-fbi-informants [https://perma.cc/NH7P-T3XG]. This number was up from 1,500 in
1975. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S INVESTIGATIVE
GUIDELINES 34 (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter OIG Compliance Report], https://oig.justice.gov/
special/0509/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/HY9A-CGLT].
9 See infra notes 48–58 and accompanying text.
10 See Steven Greer, Towards a Sociological Model of the Police Informant, 46
BRIT. J. SOC. 509, 510 (1995). According to the FBI’s definition, a Confidential Informant
is “any individual who provides useful and credible information to a Justice Law
Enforcement Agency (JLEA) regarding felonious criminal activities and from whom the
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a concerned citizen, an anonymous tipster, or a paid-off mafia
boss. Individuals become informants for a variety of reasons:
money, fear of punishment for a crime, fear of criminal
associates or revenge, civic duty, repentance for past crimes, and
furloughed prisoners to list a few.11 The majority of formal
informants are coerced through the criminal process, and agree
to inform in exchange for some form of leniency.12 As a result,
most legal scholarship addressing informant recruitment has
focused on informers who have broken the law, or who have some
other nexus with criminal activity, and have been subsequently
recruited in exchange for leniency. Some scholars have raised
concerns about the inherently coercive aspects of recruitment in
the criminal context,13 while most are concerned with the
challenges inherent to working with informants who might have
themselves committed crimes.14 Reform proposals have similarly
focused on criminal informants.15 Yet the “intelligence informants”
described in this article, while coerced, are not coerced through the
criminal process and have thus been subject to little scrutiny.
Despite the widespread, regular prodding of information
from Muslim-Americans about their daily life, there has not
JLEA expects or intends to obtain additional useful and credible information regarding
such activities in the future.” OIG Compliance Report, supra note 8, at 63 (citing the
Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants).
11 See DENNIS G. FITZGERALD, INFORMANTS AND UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LAW, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE 21–24 (2007).
12 See id. at 22 (avoiding punishment for a criminal act is the “most frequently
encountered motivation” for someone to become an informant); see also ALEXANDRA
NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE
9 (2009) (“[T]his is not a book about everyone who gives information to the police . . . . it
addresses the very specific but widespread governmental practice of rewarding
informants who have broken the law.”); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS:
MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS AGENTS 64–65 (1978) (“Overwhelmingly, informants are
recruited from among persons who are themselves criminals or closely connected with
criminals.”); Michael L. Rich, Coerced Informants and Thirteenth Amendment Limitations
on the Police-Informant Relationship, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 681, 695 (2010).
13 See Rich, supra note 12, at 695–96 (arguing that the informant working
under the threat of being subjected to criminal process is a form of involuntary
servitude). See generally Robert L. Misner & John H. Clough, Arrestees as Informants: A
Thirteenth Amendment Analysis, 29 STAN. L. REV. 713 (1977); Colleen Melody,
Comment, Trading Information for Safety: Immigrant Informants, Federal Law
Enforcement Agents, and the Viability of Non-Deportation Agreements, 83 WASH. L. REV.
599 (2008) (arguing that the Convention Against Torture and substantive due process
protections for immigrants who have served as informants are insufficient).
14 See
generally Mary Nicol Bowman, Truth or Consequences: SelfIncriminating Statements and Informant Veracity, 40 N.M. L. REV. 225 (2010); Daniel
C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of Purchasing Information
from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT’G. REP. 292 (1996); Amanda J. Schreiber, Note, Dealing
with the Devil: An Examination of the FBI’s Troubled Relationship with Its Confidential
Informants, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 301, 302–03 (2001) (focusing on confidential
informants who are not necessarily being investigated, but are themselves a part of a
criminal network).
15 See infra Section V.A.
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been any attempt to frame this as informant recruitment that
deserves critical attention, procedural safeguards, or oversight.
Nor has there been much scholarly or political scrutiny of the
methods through which the FBI populates its expansive—and
expanding—registry of informants with individuals who have
the linguistic, cultural, and religious knowledge that would
enable them to be effectively used to gather information about
the daily life of Muslim-American populations.16 This article
shows how the daily questioning of individuals for intelligence,
the recruitment of “eyes and ears” among Muslim communities
is not subjected to any oversight—not even the limited oversight
that is afforded to the recruitment of criminal informants.
Recent debates around the limits of surveillance have
centered around technological surveillance, and we have all but
written out humans from the conversation. On all sides of the
civil liberties debate, scholars and practitioners scrutinize
technological developments, as well as novel surveillance
equipment and methods, while battling over regulating the right
balance between privacy concerns and security presented by
these new forms of infiltration.17 The development of human
sources, however—the oldest form of surveillance—has not been
subjected to similar scrutiny, even though it presents distinct
harms. Indeed, while this article focuses on the harms of
informants as experienced on the “front end” at the recruitment
stage, it is crucial to also note the equally devastating harms
stemming from the use of informants on the “back end,” as
targets and communities are experiencing the harms resulting

16 One article arguing for the expanded use of S-6 Visas is the only article that
addresses the recruitment process in the counterterrorism context. See Emily Stabile,
Comment, Recruiting Terrorism Informants: The Problems with Immigration Incentives
and the S-6 Visa, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 235 (2014).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016) cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402) (mem.), and accompanying
amicus briefs (presenting the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits law
enforcement from accessing, without a warrant, an individual’s cellular phone records
that can reveal his location and movements); Charlie Savage, Surveillance and Privacy
Debate Reaches Pivotal Moment in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/us/politics/nsa-surveillance-privacy-section-702amendment.html [https://perma.cc/GLJ7-EY3D] (describing Congressional debates
around increasing privacy protections in light of reports of widespread NSA surveillance);
Charlie Savage & Ron Nixon, Privacy Complaints Mount Over Phone Searches at U.S. Border
Since 2011, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/22/us/politics/usborder-privacy-phone-searches.html [https://perma.cc/YF8H-UWC2]; Sophia Cope, Amul
Kalia, Seth Schoen & Adam Schwartz, Digital Privacy at the U.S. Border: Protecting the
Data on Your Devices, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 2017), https://www.eff.org/wp/digitalprivacy-us-border-2017 [https://perma.cc/5T9U-AKZZ] (providing advice and guidance to
users concerned about information being seized from their devices during travels).
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from informant recruitment.18 This article advocates for a more
focused attention to the abuses inherent to the practices of
intelligence informant recruitment, draws on some of the lessons
learned from the criminal informant setting, and aims to import
those lessons into the intelligence setting.
A.

A Heavy Reliance on Informants for Counterterrorism
Prosecutions

The use of informants has been a prominent and
deliberate feature of prosecutions that the government has
characterized as related to terrorism. In 2002, the Attorney
General Guidelines were revised to authorize, among other
things, the development and deployment of informants at the
earlier stages of investigation that require the lowest quantum
of proof to be initiated.19 A presidential directive from 2004 called
for an expansion of the FBI’s informant program, and as a result,
in 2008 the FBI requested funding for a software program to
track and manage the growing number of informants.20
Amendments to the Guidelines followed in 2008.21 Documents
from 2015 show a further, steady expansion of the role of
informants.22 While it is difficult to determine how many
informants are utilized for particular law enforcement

18 See CLEAR PROJECT, ASIAN AM. LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, & MUSLIM AM.
CIVIL LIBERTIES COAL., MAPPING MUSLIMS: NYPD SPYING AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN
MUSLIMS 25–30 (2013) [hereinafter MAPPING MUSLIMS] (examining the impact of
intensive police surveillance including the use of informants and undercovers on MuslimAmerican communities in New York City); see also Jeanne Theoharis, “I Feel Like a
Despised Insect”: Coming of Age Under Surveillance in New York, INTERCEPT (Feb. 18,
2016, 11:04 AM), https://theintercept.com/2016/02/18/coming-of-age-under-surveillancein-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/89FN-G4G4], for a powerful account of the deeply
personal impacts of betrayal by friends revealed to be informants. For studies on the
harmful impacts of informants in other contexts, see PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A
HIP HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (2009); see also NATAPOFF, supra note 12. This has also been
theorized in other countries and contexts. See PADDY HILLYARD, SUSPECT COMMUNITY:
PEOPLE’S EXPERIENCE OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACTS IN BRITAIN (1993)
(looking at peoples’ experiences under the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain and
Northern Ireland).
19 See OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON
GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND T ERRORISM ENTERPRISE
INVESTIGATIONS 1, 8–12 (2002).
20 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 8, at 4–24.
21 See Memorandum from the Office of the Att’y Gen. to the Heads of Dep’t
Components 2–3 (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelinesmemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/K939-YM87] (explaining how the new guidelines enable the
FBI to task “human sources” to seek information about threats to national security).
22 See Trevor Aaronson, The FBI Gives Itself Lots of Rope to Pull in Informants,
INTERCEPT (Jan. 31, 2017, 7:15 AM), https://theintercept.com/2017/01/31/the-fbi-givesitself-lots-of-rope-to-pull-in-informants/ [https://perma.cc/MA9L-X3E8].
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investigations,23 the FBI’s counterterrorism priorities suggest
that Muslim-Americans dominate the expanding roster.24
Informant involvement has become the hallmark of
terrorism prosecutions.25 A 2014 study found that nearly half of
federal counterterrorism convictions were cases involving
informants, and in many cases, the informants played a central
role.26 The use of informants in counterterrorism investigations
and prosecutions has received a significant amount of public and
scholarly attention, but that attention has primarily focused on
the use of informants in the criminal setting. Specifically,
observers have focused on the prominent role informants take in
securing a prosecution and the possible evidentiary and due
process issues that arise for defendants.27 Scholarly work
23 See Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward A New Vision of Informants: A History
of Abuses and Suggestions for Reform, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81, 84 (1994).
24 See Talal Ansari & Siraj Datoo, Welcome to America—Now Spy on Your
Friends, BUZZFEED (Jan. 28, 2016, 4:22 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/talalansari/
welcome-to-america-now-spy-on-your-friends?utm_term=.fwPo6P7mq#.yk6r62jl3 [https://
perma.cc/5K4P-H29Z] (quoting anonymous FBI agent emphasizing the importance of
sources among the Muslim community); see also NPR Staff, supra note 8 (for support that
the numbers are high); Michael Evans & Richard Ford, Recruit Muslim Spies in the War
on Terror, Urges New Security Chief, TIMES (London) (July 9, 2007, 1:00 AM), https://
www.thetimes.co.uk/article/recruit-muslim-spies-in-war-on-terror-urges-new-securitychief-50zxftrhlrb [https://perma.cc/V2YP-3MC9]; Intel Agencies Seek Help Recruiting
Immigrants, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 17, 2008) http://newsok.com/article/3244585
[https://perma.cc/S6UY-CZB2].
25 In this article, I adopt the U.S. government’s labeling of “terrorism
prosecutions” for the purposes of making an argument about informant recruitment
among Muslim communities. However, it is worth noting that many of the cases that the
Department of Justice has labeled as terrorism prosecutions sometime involve charges
that are unrelated to terrorism. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILLUSION OF JUSTICE:
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN US TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 201–02 (July 21, 2014)
[hereinafter ILLUSION OF JUSTICE], https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/07/21/illusionjustice/human-rights-abuses-us-terrorism-prosecutions [https://perma.cc/DAQ6-ALBB];
see also Andrew Lindsay, What the Data Tells Us About Immigration and Terrorism,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/whatdata-tells-us-about-immigration-and-terrorism [https://perma.cc/7HT5-BZJ2]. Moreover,
cases that some might argue should be labeled as “terrorism” cases, but do not involve Muslim
or Arab defendants, are often not included in the official accounts of “terrorism prosecutions.”
26 ILLUSION OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 21.
27 See id.; CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOB. JUSTICE, TARGETED AND
ENTRAPPED: MANUFACTURING THE “HOMEGROWN THREAT” IN THE UNITED STATES 39–40
(2011); see also Trevor Aaronson, The Informants, MOTHER JONES (Sept./Oct. 2011), https://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/07/fbi-terrorist-informants/ [https://perma.cc/4RSZ-YXPN];
Paul Harris, The Ex-FBI Informant With a Change of Heart: ‘There Is No Real Hunt. It’s
Fixed’, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2012, 12:50 PM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2012/mar/20/fbi-informant [https://perma.cc/R6V6-JTBA]; Anjali Kamat & Jacquie
Soohen, Entrapment or Foiling Terror? FBI’s Reliance on Paid Informants Raises
Questions About Validity of Terrorism Cases, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Oct. 6, 2010), https://
www.democracynow.org/2010/10/6/entrapment_or_foiling_terror_fbis_reliance [https://
perma.cc/EP5Z-VA4Q]; Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Steps Up Use of Stings in ISIS Cases, N.Y.
TIMES (June 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/us/fbi-isis-terrorism-stings.html
[https://perma.cc/XXU8-LWV4]; (T)ERROR (Charlotte Street Films, 2015) (documentary
following FBI informant during an undercover operation).
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examining the use of informants in the terrorism context has
also primarily focused on entrapment or other abuses by
informants engaging in unlawful activity.28 Others have written
about the privacy and due process concerns that result from the
more permissive rules surrounding the deployment of informants
in national security investigations.29
Some of the informants themselves have publicly spoken
out, and been profiled by prominent media outlets,30 while
others’ identities have been revealed when their work eventually
led to a prosecution.31 While it is impossible to draw generalized
conclusions about the identity of informants given the inherent
secrecy around informant practices, these profiles all reveal one
common feature—the informants used in terrorism prosecutions
28 For the most definitive summary of entrapment concerns, see Wadie E. Said,
The Terrorist Informant, 85 WASH. L. REV. 687 (2010); see also Wadie E. Said, The
Message and Means of the Modern Terrorism Prosecution, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 175, 190–92 (2012); Dru Stevenson, Effect of the National Security Paradigm on
Criminal Law, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 162 (2011). See generally Francesca
Laguardia, Terrorists, Informants, and Buffoons: The Case for Downward Departure as
a Response to Entrapment, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 171 (2013) (looking at the cases of
entrapment in terrorism prosecutions, arguing that it should be considered at
sentencing); Jesse J. Norris, Entrapment and Terrorism on the Left: An Analysis of Post9/11 Cases, 19 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 236 (2016); Jesse J. Norris, Why the F.B.I. and the
Courts Are Wrong About Entrapment and Terrorism, 84 MISS. L.J. 1257 (2015); Jessica
A. Roth, The Anomaly of Entrapment, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 979 (2014); Dejan M. Gantar,
Note, Criminalizing the Armchair Terrorist: Entrapment and the Domestic Terrorism
Prosecution, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 135 (2014);
29 See generally Daniel Ward, Note, Confidential Informants in National
Security Investigations 47 B.C. L REV. 627 (2006) (Ward’s note focuses on the differences
between how evidence obtained from informants may be used in the criminal setting and
the terrorism context).
30 A few prominent examples: Craig Monteilh spoke with the press about his
work as an informant infiltrating a mosque in Orange County, California. The Convert,
THIS AM. LIFE (Aug. 10, 2012), https://thisamericanlife.org/471/the-convert [https://
perma.cc/377E-A3QJ]. Saeed Torres was the subject of an award-winning documentary,
(T)ERROR, which allowed the cameras to roll while he was undertaking an FBI sting
operation. (T)ERROR, supra note 27. Shahed Hussain testified in public proceedings,
and was subsequently profiled by Trevor Aaronson. Trevor Aaronson, Timeline: The
Making of an FBI Superinformant, MOTHER JONES (Sept./Oct. 2011), https://www.
motherjones.com/politics/2011/07/shahed-hussain-fbi-informant/ [https://perma.cc/8WEWF4B2]. Shamiur Rahman, an NYPD informant, also spoke to the press. Matt Apuzzo &
Adam Goldman, Informant: NYPD Paid Me to ‘Bait’ Muslims, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 23,
2012), https://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/2012/informant-nypd-paid-me-to-bait-muslims
[https://perma.cc/9AXH-7DW7].
31 Osama Eldawoody, an informant who was recruited by the NYPD, was
publicly identified after he was made to testify in court. Robin Shulman, The Informer:
Behind the Scenes, or Setting the Stage? WASH. POST (May 29, 2007), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/28/AR2007052801401.html [https://
perma.cc/236K-XN4Q]. An undercover officer (not an informant) who was sent to
Brooklyn College by the NYPD also ultimately had her identity revealed when
community members pieced together the information made public through the
prosecution of two young women in New York. Aviva Stahl, Brooklyn College Students:
NYPD Illegally Spied on Us and Lied About It, GOTHAMIST (Jan. 5, 2016, 3:01 PM),
http://gothamist.com/2016/01/05/nypd_brooklyn_college_cuny_spy.php [https://perma.cc/
Y884-FL7X].
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had been touched by the criminal justice system in some way.
Some cooperated in exchange for leniency when they were
suspected or accused of a crime, while others had a criminal
record and cooperated for remuneration.32 In this way, their
recruitment does not differ significantly from that of an
informant in the drug or white-collar crime context. Our
understanding of the details of the Muslim informant
experience, however, suffers from a selection bias: other than the
rare instances where informants speak to the media or whose
identities are revealed through the prosecution of their targets,
their identities generally remain unknown.
B.

Intelligence Informants

Intelligence informants can be distinguished from the
informants that are more prominently reported on in the
terrorism context.33 Perspectives from community-based groups
and organizations, as well as attorneys working with these
communities, along with information gleaned through litigation
or leaked documents all suggest that there is a broader
informant recruitment effort underway among Muslim
communities in the United States. Intelligence informants are
typically non-criminal sources that the FBI seeks to cultivate from
among the communities it aims to infiltrate. As a result of the FBI’s
shift from a prosecutorial model towards a preventative,34 or

32 For example, after Shahed Hussein was arrested for helping test-takers
cheat at the Department of Motor Vehicles, he wore a wire to uncover his partners in the
DMV scam in exchange for avoiding charges. He was later used as an informant in at
least two terrorism-related prosecutions. See Aaronson, supra note 30; Saeed Torres was
first arrested for grand larceny and became an informant to reduce his sentence.
(T)ERROR, supra note 27.
33 See supra notes 28–32.
34 See Homeland Threats and Agency Responses: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Homeland Sec. & Gov’tl Affairs, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) (statement of Robert S. Mueller,
Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation) http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=
7ab6dc14-f3f9-43e9-aae0-4ea144c89447 [https://perma.cc/2B3Y-H6Y2]; GARRETT M.
GRAFF, THE THREAT MATRIX: THE FBI AT WAR IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM, 404 (2011)
(citing Memorandum from Robert S. Mueller III, Director, FBI, to Special Agents in
Charge of FBI Field Offices) (“While every office will have different crime problems that
will require varying levels of resources, the FBI has just one set of priorities . . . stop the
next attack.”); Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93
MINN. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2008) (noting that law enforcement is increasingly preventative,
rather than focused on prosecution); Scott Shane & Lowell Bergman, F.B.I. Struggling to
Reinvent Itself to Fight Terror, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/
10/10/us/10fbi.html?pagewanted=printand_r=0 [https://perma.cc/47ES-V3M3] (noting that
building prosecutions is no longer a top FBI priority); Press Release, FBI, FBI Response to
ACLU Report, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-responseto-aclu-report [https://perma.cc/DJZ6-RZS5] (Oct. 20, 2011) (“FBI cannot simply wait for
people to report potential threats.”).
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deterrence model,35 it has also shifted towards broad-based
intelligence gathering and monitoring of Muslim communities.36
Much of the intelligence gathering and monitoring has utilized
emerging technological developments and other data-gathering
techniques—including scaling government records, reviewing
census data,37 utilizing geospatial or domain mapping,38
engaging in online surveillance and community outreach,39 or
the installation of monitoring and surveillance equipment, or
other types of surveillance (with or without warrants).40
Of interest here are the techniques that involve human
sources: human infiltration of community and personal spaces.
In order to serve as “eyes and ears” and participate in the
surveying of Muslim communities, membership or familiarity
with those communities is of primary significance. Some
informants pose as newcomers or converts,41 but most are
35 See Samuel J. Rascoff, Counterterrorism and New Deterrence, 89 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 830, 830–32 (2014) (arguing that counterterrorism efforts are premised on a
deterrence rationale, and that the American legal framework must be updated to account
for this emerging practice).
36 A central pillar of this move has been the attempt to identify behavior that
might signal potential terrorism—a virtually impossible proposition. This has resulted
in the proliferation of radicalization theories premised on the notion that certain speech
or associations might be precursors to terrorism. See generally Amna Akbar, Policing
“Radicalization”, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 809 (2013).
37 Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Government Linking Various
Criminal Behaviors to Certain Racial Ethnic Groups, Documents Obtained by ACLU Reveal
(Oct. 20, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/news/foia-documents-fbi-show-unconstitutional-racialprofiling) [https://perma.cc/7MYN-7JHD].
38 The FBI’s Domestic Investigation and Operations Guide allows for “Domain
Management,” which involves understanding the territory in which the FBI operates,
and amounts to mapping communities. ACLU Eye on the FBI: The FBI is Engaged in
Unconstitutional Racial Profiling and Racial “Mapping,” AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
(Oct. 20, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/aclu-eye-fbi-fbi-engaged-unconstitutional-racialprofiling-and-racial-mapping [https://perma.cc/343W-Z3VV].
39 See Nine Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to Homeland:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’tl Affairs, 111th Cong. 5–6 (2010)
(statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI) https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/testimonies/witnesses/attachments/09/22/10//09-22-10-mueller-9yrs-after-911.pdf) [https://
perma.cc/5ECB-9T78] (discussing FBI’s Specialized Community Outreach Team, composed of
special agents and community outreach specialists); Cora Currier, Spies Among Us: How
Community Outreach Programs to Muslims Blur Lines Between Outreach and
Intelligence, INTERCEPT (Jan. 21, 2015, 11:10 AM), https://theintercept.com/2015/01/
21/spies-among-us-community-outreach-programs-muslims-blur-lines-outreach-intelligence/
[https://perma.cc/75A2-2ZFB] (2009 documents described a plan in Minnesota to use
community outreach efforts to gather information about radicalized individuals, gang
members and violent offenders); Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, FBI Storing
Information on Activities Protected by the First Amendment, Memos Obtained by ACLU
Show (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/news/foia-documents-show-fbi-illegallycollecting-intelligence-under-guise-community-outreach) [https://perma.cc/G4N6-5N49].
40 See Akbar, supra note 36, at 854–68 (detailing range of post-September 11
counterterrorism techniques and practices).
41 Paid informant Craig Monteilh posed as a convert, taking his shahada
(public declaration of Muslim faith) at the mosque he was infiltrating. See First Amended
Complaint Class Action at ¶¶ 86–146, Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 884 F.
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recruited from within the same communities that the FBI seeks
to infiltrate.42 While some are recruited through the criminal
process, many are recruited with the use of non-criminal forms
of pressure.
This process is sometimes formal, and sometimes
informal. Formal recruitment as a Confidential Human Source
is a multistage process, involving some, albeit limited, oversight
and approval.43 Those who are formally recruited to the FBI’s
arsenal of informants, however, do not represent the full extent
of the FBI’s human sources. This is in part because the
requirements for recruiting Confidential Human Sources,
discussed further below, have been described as “cumbersome”
by FBI agents.44 Indeed, an Inspector General report investigating
FBI compliance with those requirements has found that the
current framework encourages agents to “use sources [that] are not
formally registered [within] the informant program.”45
Informal informants appear ubiquitous. Law enforcement
documents suggest that informant recruitment occurs on a daily
basis, as a matter of policy, at borders.46 Requests for information
from Muslim community members occur on a widespread basis,
through what are sometimes called “voluntary interviews.”47
Although such an activity is not formally categorized as informant
recruitment, these individuals are effectively being used as
informants.48 During these encounters, law enforcement agents
Supp. 2d 1022 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 8:11-cv-00301-CJC (VBKx)). He noted that the FBI
asked him to collect as much information as he could about the regular goings on in the
mosque community in Orange County, California. Id. An undercover officer tasked with
infiltrating Muslim student groups at Brooklyn College also publicly converted to Islam
in front of the students. Stahl, supra note 31.
42 Cora Currier, The FBI Wanted to Target Yemenis Through Student Groups
and Mosques, INTERCEPT (Sept. 29, 2016, 2:33 PM), https://theintercept.com/2016/09/29/
the-fbi-wanted-to-target-yemenis-through-student-groups-and-mosques/ [https://perma.cc/
93Y7-QGV2].
43 See infra Section IV.A.
44 OIG Compliance Report, supra note 8, at 8.
45 Id.
46 Cora Currier, Revealed: The FBI’s Secret Methods for Recruiting Informants
at the Border, INTERCEPT (Oct. 5, 2016, 2:52 PM) (discussing Customs and Border Patrol
documents stating “that the ‘airport is a great place to spot/ assess’ sources,” and FBI
documents that detail the recruitment process.).
47 See Shirin Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement: The First Amendment and
Counterterrorism Interviews, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 41, 51 (2011).
48 There are many other ways in which the government is turning citizens into
informants that fall outside the scope of this article because the techniques do not entail
the same degree of coercion, even though they have been criticized on other grounds. For
example, the current priority on “Countering Violent Extremism” has focused on
obtaining information from Muslim community leadership as well as service providers,
enlisting them in efforts to counter extremism aimed at recruiting leadership, as well as
other agencies, into the intelligence-gathering apparatus. See generally Sahar F. Aziz,
Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 147 (2014) (criticizing the
community policing in counterterrorism model as currently deployed, arguing that its
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approach an individual at their home, workplace, or in the
street, and ask them for information. This ranges from
information about people they know, their travels, their political
views or religious practices.49 As a result of their quotidian nature,
there is no formal reporting of the numbers or frequency of these
encounters. Available data is scarce but staggering.50 Anecdotal
evidence suggests that encounters such as the ones described above
occur as a matter of course in some communities.51
Civil rights organizations have taken to educating
communities about their rights during such encounters,
including their right to decline having that conversation, or to
insist on having an attorney present for it.52 While these
interviews are technically “voluntary,” they have been described
as quite coercive in reality.53 Many individuals feel coerced into
speaking with law enforcement agents—for some, the pressure
stems from feeling the need to prove that they have “nothing to

aim to coopt Muslim community leaders into gathering intelligence for law enforcement
cannot be reconciled with a community policing model); see also Martin Innes, Policing
Uncertainty: Countering Terror Through Community Intelligence and Democratic
Policing, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 222, 232 (2006) (noting that community
engagement is often intended to develop a “community intelligence feed” about communities).
49 Diala Shamas, Where’s the Outrage When the FBI Targets Muslims?, NATION
(Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/wheres-outrage-when-fbi-targetsmuslims/ [https://perma.cc/B4NU-M8RB]; see also Sinnar, supra note 47, at 45–46
(arguing that interviews based on First-Amendment expression deserve heightened
scrutiny because they impose a substantial burden on those First Amendment rights,
including stigmatic harm, and have chilling effects on speech).
50 See Sinnar, supra note 47, at 47 (citing to some estimates between 200,000
and 500,000 such interviews in 2005).
51 See Thomas Ginsberg, Officials Begin ‘Voluntary Interviews’ of Iraqi
Nationals, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 21, 2003, at A15; Mary Beth Sheridan, Interviews of
Muslims to Broaden, WASH. POST (July 17, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A56080-2004Jul16.html [https://perma.cc/6KL7-A5YD] (noting a spurt in
interviews in the Washington area of individuals the FBI identified by “intelligence or
investigative information”; for example, a student of Iranian descent was asked about
Iranian groups based in the Middle East, while others were asked broad questions, such
as their opinion of the U.S. invasion of Iraq or the Syrian government).
52 See, e.g., Know Your Rights: What To Do in Interactions With Law
Enforcement, CREATING LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY & RESPONSIBILITY
(CLEAR) PROJECT http://www.cunyclear.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/LE-pamphlet_
11082012.pdf [https://perma.cc/WV5S-96BB]; Got Rights?, MUSLIM ADVOCATES https://
www.muslimadvocates.org/got_rights/ [https://perma.cc/Q27L-EM68]; Know Your Rights
with Law Enforcement, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS https://www.
cair.com/know-your-rights.html [https://perma.cc/2JYV-XALY]; If An Agent Knocks,
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Sept. 25, 2009), https://ccrjustice.org/if-agent-knocksbooklet [https://perma.cc/V679-TTKF].
53 See Tracey Maclin, “Voluntary” Interviews and Airport Searches of Middle
Eastern Men: The Fourth Amendment in a Time of Terror, 73 MISS L.J. 471, 507 (2003)
(arguing that the reasonable person test is a “hoax” and is “misguided,” and that the
notion that reasonable people feel free to ignore the police “has never been supported by
empirical evidence”); Shamas, supra note 49; Sinnar, supra note 47, at 42, 50–51.
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hide.”54 Others might have concerns about being stigmatized as
“uncooperative” or as not supporting the fight against
terrorism.55 Yet others, particularly those individuals who come
from immigrant backgrounds, have concerns about pending
immigration matters—and FBI agents frequently raise these
matters in their initial encounters.56 FBI agents are reported to
engage in overtly aggressive, intimidating tactics.57 These
concerns are exacerbated by the notion that many members of
Muslim communities come from immigrant backgrounds, and
have culturally-rooted fears about disobeying state authorities.58
II.

COERCING MUSLIM INFORMERS: TARGETING TRAVEL,
IMMIGRATION STATUS

A.

The Search for Non-Criminal Levers

The criminal process does not give FBI agents access to
the needed population of potential informants. The desirable
informants are generally Muslim, their primary role is to
provide information on the broader community,59 and they may
never be implicated in a criminal prosecution. Indeed, as one
leaked FBI presentation puts it, agents are instructed to “look[ ] for
‘good guys,’ not ‘bad guys,’” when identifying potential informants.60

54 See Aziz, supra note 48, at 148 (describing how community policing divides
Muslim communities into “Good Muslims” willing to cooperate with law enforcement,
and “Bad Muslims” who assert their rights).
55 See Ramzi Kassem & Diala Shamas, Rebellious Lawyering in the Security
State, 23 CLIN. L. REV. 671, 684–87 (2017).
56 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-03-459, HOMELAND SECURITY:
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, 9
(Apr. 2003), https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/237849.pdf [https://perma.cc/P37T-SQML]
(The U. S. Attorney’s Office review noted that its interviewees reported being afraid of
repercussions on their immigration matters if they declining to participate).
57 See Trevor Aronson, “You Have The Way Out”: Recordings Capture the Brutal
FBI Tactics to Recruit a Potential Informant, INTERCEPT (Oct. 10, 2017, 10:45 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2017/10/10/recordings-capture-brutal-fbi-tactics-to-recruit-potentialinformant/ [https://perma.cc/8CMS-MW35]; Kassem & Shamas, supra note 55, at 683
(describing Dr. Azem’s case).
58 See Kassem & Shamas, supra note 55, at 694; FBI Accused of Targeting
Islamic Leaders, Pressuring Them to Become Informants, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2014, 18:11)
https://www.rt.com/usa/202927-muslim-fbi-informants-pressure/ [https://perma.cc/
RA2D-RM9Q] (quoting an attorney from a Muslim civil liberties group who stated:
“Many Muslims come from Third World countries where such practices are common fare
for the secret police. But in the U.S. you don’t expect such blackmail, with threats of
deportation or worse.”).
59 Akbar, supra note 36, at 869 (noting that Muslim individuals are widely
viewed as either potential terrorists, or potential sources of information).
60 Currier, supra note 46.
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For a criminal informant, a nexus with a criminal
network is a desirable trait,61 or as one expert described it, an
individual who has “guilty knowledge.”62 When the goal is to
gather intelligence, however, the focus is not on criminal
association, but rather on social networks: the relevant nexus is
with the population or group that is subject to scrutiny.63 The
target for infiltration under current counterterrorism practices
is much broader than a criminal network: it is an entire religious
or cultural group.64 For example, a now public FBI training
document contained an instruction to focus on recruiting
potential confidential human sources and recommended
targeting informants from within Muslim student groups. The
document explained that targeting the Muslim student
demographic was likely to yield individuals who “are in the
social circles where travel for overseas study is discussed,” and
urged FBI agents to use them as “human tripwires.”65 Other
informants report being told that they are desirable because
they “look Middle Eastern.”66
In order to coerce individuals who have neither a criminal
record nor any reason to be arrested to regularly provide
information to the government, FBI agents are utilizing the
variety of both formal and informal tools that are increasingly
at their disposal.67 Of course, criminal charges or threats of
criminal charges are used to pressure informants in the

61 Agents are encouraged to recruit informants who have proximity to
criminals or crime. MALACHI L. HARNEY & JOHN C. CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT 40 (2d ed., Thomas Books 1968); Rich, supra note 12, at 693.
62 WILSON, supra note 12, at 65.
63 HEWITT, supra note 5, at 108–09 (noting that Stasi officials needed to recruit
informers who had the backgrounds or shared identities with the groups they were
seeking to infiltrate.); Gary T. Marx, Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social
Movement Participant: The Agent Provocateur and the Informant, in TERRORISM: THE
THIRD OR NEW LEFT WAVE 194, 201 (David C. Rapoport, ed., 2006).
64 Professor Shirin Sinnar made a variation of this observation about
voluntary interviews. Her analysis focused on law enforcement interviews triggered by
protected speech, as opposed to membership to a particular community, or placement as
a potential informant. See generally Sinnar, supra note 47.
65 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, RESPONDING TO THE YEMENI THREAT,
SCENARIOS FOR CHS DEVELOPMENT 16–17 https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
3116066-Yemen-slideshow-Doc.html#document/p1 [https://perma.cc/9QZR-PFDP]; see
also Currier, supra note 42.
66 Kiran Khalid, Iowa Muslim Leader: Law Enforcement Betrayed Us, CNN: IN
AMERICA (Feb. 3, 2012, 8:48 PM EST), http://inamerica.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/03/iowamuslim-leader-law-enforcement-betrayed-us/ [https://perma.cc/V7FY-LFC3].
67 In addition to the tools discussed at length in this article, there is evidence
that “traditional” non-criminal coercive methods are used, such as blackmail and
psychological pressure. See, e.g., Aaronson supra note 22 (describing internal FBI
documents encouraging the identification of a target’s “motivations and vulnerabilities”).
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counterterrorism context.68 Similarly, the more informal
pressure tactics listed in the previous Part are frequently used—
and in this context, this has often taken the form of accusations
of being uncooperative or unpatriotic.69 This article, however,
specifically focuses on FBI discretion to influence the adjudication
of immigration benefits, and to deny people boarding through
placement on the No-Fly List.
As agents are being instructed to be creative in their
recruitment of sources, they look towards the most powerful
levers at their disposal vis-à-vis the individuals they are seeking
to recruit.70 In the context of the war on drugs and day-to-day
policing of street crimes, the criminalization of a broad range of
behavior associated with poverty and broken windows policing
have brought almost everyone from certain over-policed
communities within the reach of the state’s criminal apparatus.71
Officers are often able to credibly threaten desired informants with
regular searches, arrest, or even prosecution. This concern has
driven many of the legal, social, and cultural pushes for reforming
the criminal justice system’s heavy reliance on “snitching.”72
Muslim-American communities, on the other hand,
present different target demographics. While they are diverse,
many in the community are immigrants either themselves, or

68 See JUDE MCCULLOCH & DEAN WILSON, PRE-CRIME: PRE-EMPTION,
PRECAUTION AND THE FUTURE, 115–16 (2016) (noting the increased use of inchoate
crimes as a way to threaten prosecution over a growing category of people and force
people to become informants); Arun Kundnani, Emily Keppler & Muki Naiaer, How One
Man Refused to Spy on Fellow Muslims for the FBI—and then Lost Everything, NATION
(Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-one-man-refused-spy-fellowmuslims-fbi-and-then-lost-everything/ [https://perma.cc/8DEN-7CXS] (describing the
case of Ayyub Abdul-Alim, an African-American Muslim who was charged with gun
possession charges, and told that he could walk away if he agreed to become an informant
and incite FBI targets to violent action); Aaronson, supra note 57. The New York City
Police Department also set up the “Citywide Debriefing Team” which focused on seeking
out arrestees with a Muslim last name and attempting to recruit them to become
informants. See Joseph Goldstein, New York Police Recruit Muslims to Be Informers,
N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/nyregion/new-yorkpolice-recruit-muslims-to-be-informers.html [https://perma.cc/B3KE-XRS9].
69 Kassem & Shamas, supra note 55 at 687–88.
70 See WILSON, supra note 12, at 70 (“Manipulating the threats and
opportunities facing a would-be informant so as to produce a net incentive sufficient to
induce him to cooperate becomes a key skill of a narcotics agent.”).
71 See NATAPOFF, supra note 12, at 101–03 (describing the disproportionate use
and presence of informants among poor, black, urban communities and projecting how
large segments of this population are either drug offenders or chemically dependent, and
therefore vulnerable to recruitment). Recently, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Utah v.
Strieff highlighted how common outstanding warrants are. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct
2056, 2068 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
72 See NATAPOFF, supra note 12, at 121–37 for a more thorough discussion of
the “stop snitching” movement in urban centers and overly policed communities.
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have immediate relatives who are immigrants.73 As a result,
they need to travel, to naturalize, to obtain work permits and
spousal visas, and they are regularly interacting with the state
on these matters. The No-Fly List and the possibility of putting
holds on immigration petitions both operate largely in secrecy.
Because officers can deploy these coercive measures with little
to no oversight, use of the measures do not require an onerous
showing of cause and present weak procedural safeguards, they
are ripe for this type of exploitation.74
B.

Leveraging Immigration Status

Since the rush to recruit informants in the aftermath of
September 11, the immigration system has been among the most
prominent pressure points for Muslim and Middle Eastern
communities.75 Enlisting those vulnerabilities to recruit human
sources, an FBI training presentation obtained by civil liberties
groups “on recruiting informants in the Muslim community
suggest[ed that] agents exploit ‘immigration vulnerabilities’
because Muslims in the United States are ‘an immigrant
community.’”76 Another presentation urged agents to leverage
the “immigration relief dangle.”77 The Confidential Human
Source Policy Guide, as outlined below, provides detailed
instructions to agents seeking to leverage immigration status.

73 Three quarters of Muslims in America are either immigrants or the
children of immigrants. U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society, but
Continue to Believe in the American Dream, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 26, 2017), http://
www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/demographic-portrait-of-muslim-americans/#how-many-mus
lims-are-there-in-the-united-states-and-how-do-we-know [https://perma.cc/85XG-BGQA].
74 Of course, the criminal process is also secretive. Professor Natapoff argues
that this secrecy is also a principal reason why the criminal informant system is such a
core feature of law enforcement. See NATAPOFF, supra note 12, at 83–84.
75 Neil Lewis, A Nation Challenged: The Informants; Immigrants Offered
Incentives to Give Evidence on Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/
2001/11/30/us/nation-challenged-informants-immigrants-offered-incentives-give-evidence.html
[https://perma.cc/3942-FMCK] (describing an early program to provide immigration
incentives to those who would provide information to the government). Immigration was
also leveraged in other ways fairly early on, including as a way to substitute
counterterrorism arrests based on suspicion. Attorney General John Ashcroft defended
such pretextual arrests, warning the “terrorists among us” that: “If you overstay your
visa—even by one day—we will arrest you.” Att’y Gen. John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks
for the U.S. Mayor’s Conference (Oct. 25, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/
speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks10_25.htm [https://perma.cc/R6X9-YW4G].
76 A M . C IVIL L IBERTIES U NION , U NLEASHED AND U NACCOUNTABLE 40 (Sept.
2013) (citing Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Targeting—Understanding the
Fundamentals, Islamic Ummah—Where to Target, Bates #FBI036163-FBI036173),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/unleashed-and-unaccountable-fbireport.pdf [https://perma.cc/QF6J-GNY2].
77 Currier, supra note 46.

1192

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:4

Publicly available information suggests that this
instruction has been taken seriously by FBI agents. In Michigan,
a Muslim civil rights group filed a complaint with the FBI about
informant recruitment, stating that the most common
incidences involved individuals with pending immigration
matters who were approached to monitor mosques in exchange
for assistance.78 Muslim individuals have reported threats of
stalled asylum applications,79 of deportation80 or revocation of
residency status,81 and even revocation of refugee status
determinations.82 Other documented cases illustrate retaliation
for refusal to become informants through adverse action on
pending immigration matters,83 including the withdrawal of
asylum applications.84 In addition to the aforementioned
“sticks,” FBI agents also reportedly offered “carrots” or
“immigration dangles,”85 including accelerated processing of
relatives in need of a visa or other benefit,86 often after having a
role to play in putting them in abeyance.87

78 FBI Recruiting Muslim Spies, Group Says, CBS NEWS (Apr. 16, 2009, 10:54 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-recruiting-muslim-spies-group-says/ [https://perma.cc/
DLK7-QNEE].
79 ILLUSION OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 170 (interviewing a lawyer who
reported that FBI threatened to stall asylum application of her clients).
80 See Trevor Aaronson, FBI Tries to Deport Muslim Man for Refusing to Be an
Informant, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Oct. 8, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/
news/fbi-tries-to-deport-muslim-man-for-refusing-to-be-an-informant-6366555 [https://
perma.cc/4F8S-AFEE].
81 See Waldman, supra note 3.
82 See Ansari & Datoo, supra note 24 (FBI agents attempted to recruit Mr.
Osman—when he refused to be an informant, he was informed by USCIS that an earlier
determination finding him to be a member of a persecuted Tuni clan was deemed false
and his refugee status was revoked. After he obtained a lawyer, a judge on review
eventually found the revocation to be improper, and reinstated his refugee status.).
83 See JENNIE PASQUARELLA, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, MUSLIMS NEED NOT
APPLY 30, 31 (2013), https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/16184
9063-muslims-need-not-apply-aclu-socal-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXZ5-5CBY]; Yesenia
Amaro, Little-Known Law Stops Some Muslims from Obtaining US Citizenship, LAS VEGAS
REVIEW-JOURNAL (Apr. 16, 2016, 6:09 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/little-knownlaw-stops-some-muslims-from-obtaining-us-citizenship/ [https://perma.cc/Y4H9-3PU3].
84 See Jared Goyette, Miami Imam Faces Deportation to Iran, MIAMI HERALD
(Sept. 18, 2013. 5:47 PM), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/
article24545977.html [https://perma.cc/U4E8-2FW4] (When a religious leader informed
his FBI agent recruiters that he would not provide the FBI with information about the
local Muslim community, he was made to withdraw his asylum application, and
threatened with deportation.); Aaronson, supra note 80.
85 Currier, supra note 46.
86 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at ¶121; Kundnani, Keppler &
Naiaer, supra note 68 (speculating that Mr. Abdul-Alim’s wife, who acted as an
informant against her husband, may have been pressured by the FBI through her and
her family’s pending citizenship applications).
87 See PASQUARELLA, supra note 83 (describing an FBI agent’s offer to expedite
Mr. Razmara’s naturalization petition if he agreed to work as an informant). Mr.
Razmara declined to work as an informant, and his naturalization petition was delayed
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FBI agents’ threats are credible. While precise details
about the contours of the FBI’s authority to influence
immigration outcomes remain murky, the existence of a United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) program
called the Controlled Application Review and Resolution
Program (CARRP) presents one procedural vehicle through
which FBI agents can interfere in a pending immigration
matter.88 CARRP uses a U.S. government database that flags
immigration cases involving “national security concerns,” or
names that turn up on the U.S. Government’s Terrorist
Screening Database (TSDB).89 This database is known to be
overinclusive and quickly expanding.90 Moreover, individuals on
this list are not notified of their placement on the TSDB, nor are
they provided with any reasons for that placement.91
The CARRP program effectively cedes USCIS decision
making to the FBI, giving individual agents significant
discretion.92 CARRP directs USCIS agents to delay
determinations pending deconfliction, a process that is
delegated to law enforcement agencies—primarily the FBI.
for years after his refusal to become an informant and to answer questions about his
mosque. Id. at 8, 30.
88 See Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Lawsuit Charges U.S. Uses
Secret, Unfounded ‘National Security Concerns’ to Deny Muslim Immigrants Citizenship
(July 31, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/news/lawsuit-charges-us-uses-secret-unfoundednational-security-concerns-deny-muslim-immigrants [https://perma.cc/K282-K3R9]
(“[A]gency data reveals that between fiscal years 2008 and 2012, more than 19,000
people from 21 Muslim-majority countries or regions were subjected to the program.”).
89 Id.; see also PASQUARELLA, supra note 83, at 19. For a thorough description
of the CARRP program based on documents that were obtained through FOIA and
interviews, see generally PASQUARELLA, supra note 83.
90 See infra notes 102–103; see also Editorial, A Rebuff to Overbroad Watch
Lists, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/opinion/a-rebuffto-overbroad-watch-lists.html [https://perma.cc/XMR4-MMXG] (describing Ibrahim v.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 911 (N.D. Cal. 2014)); Ramzi Kassem, I Help
Innocent People Get Off the Terrorism Watch Lists. As a Gun Control Tool They’re Useless,
WASH. POST (June 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/
06/28/i-help-innocent-people-get-off-terror-watch-lists-as-a-gun-control-tool-theyre-use
less/?utm_term=.d376c39570bb [https://perma.cc/6T7G-BDJQ].
91 See Latif v. Holder, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1297–98 (D. Or. 2013) (“[A]t no
point in the available administrative process is a complainant told whether he or she is
in the TSDB or a subset of the TSDB or given any explanation for his or her inclusion on
such a list.”). There have been some changes to the procedures applicable to the No-Fly
List. See infra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
92 CARRP is not the only way in which FBI agents may influence immigration
outcomes. FBI agents have the ability to charge individuals with offenses like lying on a
government form, resulting in charges of immigration violations—sometimes legitimate,
othertimes not. See Mary Beth Sheridan, Immigration Law as an Anti-Terrorism Tool,
WASH. POST (June 13, 2005), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/
2005/06/13/immigration-law-as-anti-terrorism-tool/26d96635-cc67-44d9-b6fa-852a2de4d8
cb/?utm_term=.978fdd587a23 [https://perma.cc/BS37-AN7G] (discussing the use of
immigration charges against people who have been scrutinized for national security
investigations, even though some charges were ultimately found to have no merit).
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CARRP also provides the FBI an opportunity to comment on
USCIS’s proposed action on a case, to submit questions for
USCIS to ask in interviews, and to suggest Requests for
Evidence. The program also requires USCIS to notify the FBI as
soon as certain individuals have applied for immigration
benefits, thus allowing the FBI easy leverage in its attempts to
question or recruit the individuals as sources.93 In doing so,
CARRP enlists the immigration system into the service of the
intelligence-gathering apparatus. This raises various legal and
constitutional concerns.94
While the potential for CARRP abuse for intelligencegathering purposes has been noted by civil liberties groups, this
form of abuse has not been directly challenged in court. Policy
proposals to rein in this form of abuse have recommended that,
“at a minimum . . . USCIS must make clear [to an applicant that
their] eligibility for an immigration benefit is not contingent on
their cooperation with the FBI.”95 Nor would access to counsel
play the same mitigating role that it plays in the equivalent
criminal setting. Certainly, an attorney could improve an
individual’s ability to assess the risks associated with refusal.
An attorney could also create a record of improper FBI conduct,
acting as some deterrent. Moreover, an attorney can also
intervene through filing a mandamus action in federal district
court to force the adjudication of a naturalization application.96
Such avenues for relief, however, are costly and time-consuming.
They are also potentially risky as they cannot guarantee a
favorable outcome.97
PASQUARELLA, supra note 83 at 3.
The authority to delay or deny applications based on secret evidence and
without notice also raises due process concerns. Id. at 51. At least two lawsuits have been
filed challenging CARRP holds on constitutional grounds. See generally Complaint,
Muhanna v. U.S. Citizenship & Imm. Servs., 2:14-CV-05995 (C.D. Cal. dismissed Dec.
23, 2014), ECF No. 1; Complaint, Alwan v. U.S. Citizenship & Imm. Servs., No. 4:16-CV00692 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 24, 2017), ECF No. 1 (arguing that CARRP violated Art. 1, Section
8 Clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution, the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative
Procedure Act). Moreover, delays of pending applications appear to be in violation of
statutory requirements that USCIS adjudicate applications for immigration benefits
within 180 days of the initial filing of the application. 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) (2012).
95 PASQUARELLA, supra note 83, at 5.
96 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2012) gives an applicant a right to seek a hearing before
a U.S. district court if USCIS has not reached a decision on an application for
naturalization within 120 days. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2012). Applicants awaiting decisions
on other forms of immigration relief may also pursue a mandamus action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1361. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2012).
97 A mandamus action under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) gives a district court
jurisdiction over the naturalization petition and the court may either determine the
matter by granting or denying the naturalization application, or it may remand the
matter for determination by USCIS. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). Despite the statutory grant of
authority, many district courts are reluctant to determine the matter for USCIS when
there are “security matters” pending, and instead will simply remand. See, e.g., Hussein
93

94
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The No-Fly List98

The No-Fly List is a federal database created with the
purpose of securing aviation safety as well as national security.
A subset of the broader, consolidated Terrorist Screening
Database (sometimes referred to as the TSDB, or the
“watchlist”), placement on the No-Fly List results in a denial of
boarding any flight in the United States, or one that transits
over United States airspace.99 As a result, individuals on the NoFly List are prevented from visiting loved ones, traveling for
business, or pursuing an education, for indeterminate periods of
time. In addition, there are a number of other collateral
consequences, as watchlist information is disseminated to local
law enforcement agencies,100 and, even though it is non-criminal
information, it has appeared on individuals’ criminal rap
sheets.101 In recent years, names on the No-Fly List have
skyrocketed; as of June 2016, official reports stated that there
were 81,000 names listed.102
Despite the significant liberty interests at stake, the
threshold for nomination is low. The U.S. government has
adopted a “reasonable suspicion” standard for nomination to the
watchlist—specifically, reasonable suspicion that the individual
is “engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of
or related to, terrorism or terrorist activities.”103 The term
“related to,” a catch-all, is even broader than the already low
threshold of reasonable suspicion applied in other contexts,
including that of stop-and-frisk encounters, which requires law
v. Gonzales, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1269 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (noting several other courts’
decisions declining to make a determination and instead remanding to USCIS when the
reason for delay involves a security-related matter).
98 This article focuses on the abuse of the No-Fly List, a subcategory of the
broader Terrorist Screening Database, because its use for informant recruitment has
been more broadly reported. However, many of the arguments and vulnerabilities
discussed in this Section apply to other categories of the TSDB.
99 For thorough context and a summary of the terrorism database and its
various consequences, see JEFFREY KAHN, MRS. SHIPLEY’S GHOST: THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
AND TERRORIST WATCHLISTS (2013).
100 For a study of some of these collateral consequences, see CIVIL LIBERTIES &
NAT’L S EC. CLINIC, YALE LAW SCH. & AM. CIVIL L IBERTIES UNION, TRAPPED IN A
BLACK BOX: GROWING T ERRORISM WATCHLISTING IN EVERYDAY P OLICING 21–27
(2016), https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/area/clinic/wirac_9-11_clinic_trapped_in_
a_black_box.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ECF-822W].
101 Alex Kane, Terrorist Watchlist Errors Spread to Criminal Rap Sheets,
INTERCEPT (Mar. 15, 2016, 12:02 PM), https://theintercept.com/2016/03/15/terroristwatchlist-errors-spread-to-criminal-rap-sheets/ [https://perma.cc/Y792-7XMJ].
102 Stephen Dinan, FBI No-Fly List Revealed: 81,000 Names, but Fewer Than 1,000
Are Americans, WASH. TIMES (June 20, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/
jun/20/fbi-no-fly-list-revealed-81k-names-fewer-1k-us/ [https://perma.cc/M8K6-JGLC].
103 Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1141 (D. Or. 2014).
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enforcement to have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, as
opposed to conduct that is related to terrorist activities.104 This
lower suspicion standard is rendered even less meaningful
because it is so unlikely to be reviewed by a court. Unlike in the
police context where the potential suppression of evidence serves
as a check on police overreach,105 there is no parallel consequence
here. Leaked official guidance on the watchlisting process
reveals that a single Facebook post or Tweet may provide the
basis for watchlist placement.106
The process for challenging placement on the No-Fly List
is also onerous. In 2014, a District Court in Oregon found the
process that had been in place for several years to challenge
placement on the No-Fly List to be constitutionally inadequate.107
New procedures were announced in April 2015, likely the result
of multiple lawsuits filed and years of litigation.108 Under newly
revised procedures, a U.S. person who, after being denied
boarding on a flight, files a redress inquiry with appropriate
documentation, will now receive a letter confirming whether he
or she is on the No-Fly List. The individual will then have the
option of submitting and receiving further information, to which
the DHS should disclose “the specific criteria or criterion under
which the person has been included on the No Fly List” as well
as a summary of the information supporting placement, “to the
extent feasible and consistent with the national security and law
enforcement interests at stake.”109 Consequently, such a summary
might never be provided.
104 The phrase “terrorist activities” is also broadly defined. For a discussion on
the comparison of the “reasonable suspicion” standard in this context as opposed to
others, see Shirin Sinnar, Essay, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1566, 1581–1600 (2016).
105 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648, (1961) (describing the exclusion of evidence
as a “deterrent safeguard.”). But see United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448–54 (1976)
(discussing the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, including doubting the empirical
evidence supporting deterrence).
106 U.S. N AT ’ L C OUNTERTERRORISM C TR ., M ARCH 2013 W ATCHLISTING
GUIDANCE 34 (2013) https://www.eff.org/files/2014/07/24/2013-watchlist-guidance_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B78Z-XESV] (“Single source information, including but not limited to
‘walk-in’, ‘write-in’, or postings on social media sites, however, should not automatically
be discounted merely because of the manner in which it was received.”).
107 Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1161.
108 Notices of the revisions to the TRIP procedures were filed in several cases in
April 2015. See Notice Regarding New Redress Procedures, Mohamed v. Holder, No.
1:11-CV-50-AJT-MSN (E.D. Va. Apr. 13, 2015), ECF No. 188; Notice Regarding Revisions
to DHS TRIP Procedures, Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Or. 2014) (No. 3:10CV-00750-BR) ECF No. 197; Memorandum in Support of Government’s Motion for a
Limited Stay of Proceedings with Regard to Plaintiff ’ s Official Capacity Claims at 1,
Tanvir v. Lynch, 128 F. Supp. 3d 756 (S.D.N.Y 2015), rev’d in part sub nom. Tanvir v.
Tanzin, 889 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 1:13-cv-06951), ECF No. 90.
109 See Defendants’ Consolidated Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition at 22, Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR
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Civil liberties groups and academics question whether
the improved procedures are adequate. They argue that the
procedures still fail to provide adequate notice to individuals as
to the reasons for their nominations, do not disclose the evidence
against watch-listed individuals, and do not provide a hearing,
among other things.110 Moreover, the “reasonable suspicion”
standard for nomination itself has not been altered. As a result,
the No-Fly List remains a powerful tool in the hands of law
enforcement agents.
While the major litigation in this area has highlighted
the significant risk of error,111 public reports of abuses of the NoFly List also raise real concerns about the potential for
deliberate exploitation. The low threshold for nomination and
minimal review on the front end, combined with a procedurally
inadequate process for challenging placement on the back end,
turn the list into a powerful coercion mechanism. Individual
field agents have the ability to place a name on the No-Fly
List.112 For example, in one case that came to light after years of
litigation, a Muslim woman who was also a Stanford scholar was
denied boarding a U.S.-bound flight.113 Over the course of the
lawsuit that challenged her placement on the list and the
sufficiency of the process she was afforded, a deposition of the
nominating FBI agents revealed that her nomination was in fact
a result of human error: the agent had checked the wrong box on
a form, resulting in her placement on the No-Fly List.114 In fact,
the agent had interviewed her as part of an FBI outreach
program to Muslims and Muslim institutions in the South
Bay.115 Reports that the Terrorism Screening Center rejects
(D. Or. May 28, 2015), ECF No. 251 (citing Notice Regarding Revisions to DHS TRIP
Procedures, Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-CV-00750-BR (D. Or. Apr. 14, 2015), ECF No. 197).
110 See Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment and Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 5, Latif v. Lynch, No. 3:10-CV-00750–BR (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2015) 2015 WL
10520493, ECF No. 267; Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1790
(2015) (analyzing revised procedures, noting that they do not include rights to access the
underlying evidence that leads to nomination, live adversarial proceedings among other things).
111 See Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment and Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 5, Latif v. Lynch, No. 3:10-CV-00750-BR (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2015) 2015 WL
10520493, ECF No. 267.
112 While the watchlists are coordinated by the Terrorism Screening Center
(TSC), a multi-agency organization that is overseen by the FBI, it delegates nomination
authorities to various agencies. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN. AUDIT DIVISION, Audit Report 09–25, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION’S TERRORIST WATCHLIST NOMINATION PRACTICES (2009).
113 Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 911 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
114 Id. at 915–16 (detailing the process through which FBI agent Kelley
erroneously nominated Dr. Ibrahim to the No-Fly List).
115 Id. at 916.
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approximately 1 percent of nominations to the Database116
suggest significant control of the content of the list by the FBI
since it is the primary nominating agency.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the use and abuse of the No-Fly
List to pressure individuals to become informants has been
widely reported. For example, Mr. Tanvir and three other
American-Muslim men who had all been placed or kept on the
No-Fly List after refusing FBI agents’ overtures to become
informants filed suit in the Southern District of New York.117 The
agents sought to task them with a range of behavior, including
spying on their Muslim communities and neighborhoods,
attending certain mosques, and participating in online Islamic
forums and reporting back to the agents.118 It was not until the
day before scheduled oral argument in this case that the FBI
notified all four men that they would be able to travel.119 The
plaintiffs argued that the lack of transparency and
accountability in which the No-Fly List operates make it ripe for
abuse by FBI field agents seeking leverage to recruit
informants.120 There have been numerous other examples,
making it clear that individual agents view their power to list and
de-list people as an additional tool in their toolbox as they seek
out information from individuals about their communities.121 In
116 See Defendants’ Objections and Responses to Plaintiff ’ s First Set of
Interrogatories at 11, Mohamed v. Holder, No. 1:11-CV-00050-AJT/MSN, (E.D. Va. July
16, 2015), ECF No. 91–3
117 First Amended Complaint, supra note 2 at 2.
118 First Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 29.
119 Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, American Muslims Who
Refused to Become FBI Informants Finally Removed from No-Fly List (June 10, 2015),
https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/american-muslims-who-refusedbecome-fbi-informants-finally-removed [https://perma.cc/8YTU-6QX8].
120 Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Lawsuit Exposes FBI Abuse
of No Fly List to Coerce Individuals to Become Informants (Apr. 23, 2014),
https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/lawsuit-exposes-fbi-abuse-no-fly-listcoerce-individuals-become [https://perma.cc/YR6E-AAR7]; see also Nusrat Choudhury, The
No-Fly List: Where the FBI Goes Fishing for Informants, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Sept.
27, 2013, 10:21 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/no-fly-list-where-fbi-goes-fishing-informants
[https://perma.cc/6ZHD-4K9V] (making a similar argument in the context of another case).
121 Mr. Yonas Fikre, a U.S. citizen, alleged that FBI agents placed him on the
No-Fly List in order to coerce him to become a government informant. Fikre v. Fed.
Bureau of Investigation, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1274 (D. Or. 2014). Mr. Amir Meshal was
denied boarding, and an FBI agent offered to remove Mr. Meshal from the No-Fly list if
he agreed to serve as a government informant. Mr. Ibrahim Mashal was similarly offered
to serve as a government informant in exchange for assistance in removing his name
from the No-Fly List. See Latif v. Holder, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1300–01 (D. Or. 2013).
Mr. Yaseen Kadura, a twenty-five-year-old medical student and U.S. citizen, was placed
on the No-Fly List, and told by FBI agents that the only way he would be able to get off
the list would be to work as their informant in Libya, where he has family. See Murtaza
Hussain, How a Young American Escaped the No-Fly List, INTERCEPT (Jan. 21, 2016,
7:30 AM), https://theintercept.com/2016/01/21/how-a-young-american-escaped-the-nofly-list [https://perma.cc/477M-KRRA]. Kevin Iraniha had a similar experience. See
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an environment where agents are encouraged to recruit
individuals in ways that are “limited only by the imagination,”122
the coercive potential of the No-Fly List is significant.
III.

THE HARMS OF UNFETTERED INFORMANT RECRUITMENT

A.

The Anti-Democratic Nature of an Informer Society
Unlike the totalitarian practice, the informant in America serves of
his own free will, fulfilling one of the citizenship obligations of our
democratic form of government.
J. Edgar Hoover, 1955123

There is a fundamentally anti-democratic character to a
state’s ability to force its citizens or residents to provide
information about their beliefs, thoughts, associations, and daily
lives. At present, that is the reality borne primarily by Muslims—
however, this current infrastructure may be easily expanded.
The recruitment of terrorism informants described in this
article is different from the coercion of criminal informants,
equally omnipresent in some communities.124 Society tolerates a
certain degree of coercion against prospective informants who
are also accused or suspected of their own wrongdoing. A
negotiation of rights is a central pillar of the criminal system, as
is evidenced by the centrality of the plea agreement. It draws on
the notion that the government may justifiably impinge upon
the liberty of a person who has committed a crime.125 Or, in

Shirin Sadeghi, U.S. Citizen Put on No-Fly List to Pressure Him Into Becoming FBI
Informant, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2012), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/shirinsadeghi/kevin-iraniha-no-fly-list_b_1579208.html [https://perma.cc/2UKQ-SJNJ]. Michael
Migliore, a dual citizen of the United States and Italy, had traveled by ship to Europe
because he was on the U.S. government’s No-Fly List. Mr. Migliore believes he was
placed on the list after he refused to be interrogated by the FBI without an attorney
present. See Nick Baumann, Michael Migliore, the FBI, and Shadowy Interrogations
Abroad, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 22, 2011, 10:00 AM), https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2011/09/michael-migliore-fbi-interrogations/ [https://perma.cc/3C2J-GV63]; see
also Press Release, Council on American-Islamic Relations Greater L.A. Area Chapter,
The FBI’s Use of Informants, Recruitment and Intimidation Within Muslim
Communities (Mar. 26, 2009), https://www.scribd.com/document/106515982/CAIR-LAThe-FBI-s-use-of-Informants-Recruitment-and-Intimidation-within-Muslim-Communities
[https://perma.cc/X46J-ZJDY] (listing additional examples).
122 See, e.g., FITZGERALD, supra note 11, at 43–58 (describing recruitment
process of informants, encouraging investigators to “strike”, using forms of pressures
that are “limited only by the imagination, experience and skill of the investigator.”).
123 HEWITT, supra note 5, at 158 (citing HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 61, at 15).
124 See supra note 12–15 and accompanying text.
125 Jean-Jacques Rousseau presents the most pointed version of the rationale
that a criminal essentially “consents” to some form of retributive punishment when
committing a crime. (“[I]t is in order to avoid becoming the victim of a murderer that one
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political terms, criminal defendants are not sympathetic by
virtue of the crimes they have committed.126 In contrast, similar
moral judgments—whatever their validity—may not be drawn
against the prospective informants in the intelligence context,
as well as the unknown number of informants coerced through
other non-criminal methods.127
Sociologist and surveillance studies scholar Malin
Åkerström observed that
[a]ll societies demand that citizens report on each other to a certain
extent. How much and the range of behavior expected to be reported
varies between countries. . . . The more totalitarian and the more
interested their leaders are in suppressing criticism, the more such
informer systems will be used.128

The way a society treats its informants or handles its covert
police actions provides insight into its broader political, cultural,
and social dynamics. Gary Marx, in his sociological work on
informants, noted that “[b]y studying the changes in covert
tactics, a window on something much broader can be gained.”129
Writing in 1988, he had prescient awareness of the evolving
nature of his field, noting how perceptions of privacy were
significantly different from those fifty years earlier—and that
they would undoubtedly be different from someone reading his
book decades later.130
Presently, the burden of surveillance is disproportionately
borne by certain communities—Muslim, Arab, South Asian and
Middle Eastern communities have experienced the brunt of postSeptember 11 law enforcement policies. Indeed, there is a
distinct difference between the mass surveillance as experienced
universally in light of revelation of technologically-enabled
metadata collection,131 and the intimate, quotidian, and acute inperson consents to die if one becomes a murderer oneself.”). JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU,
ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 79 (Maurice Cranston trans. Penguin Books 1968) (1762).
126 See Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45
VAND. L. REV. 1, 40 (1992) (“The cooperating witness is not a strong candidate for
sympathy. He is likely getting much better than he deserves—either full immunity or a
lenient outcome, unmerited in terms of the degree and nature of his criminal activity,
and purchased by his often unrepentant and selfish willingness to assist in ensuring that
others get what they deserve.”).
127 See, e.g., Alice Goffman, On the Run: Wanted Men in a Philadelphia Ghetto
74 AM. SOC. REV. 339, 350 (2009) (describing instances where police officers in
Philadelphia threatened to call Child Protective Services on a woman with young
children if she fails to provide information about her older fugitive son’s whereabouts).
128 MALIN ÅKERSTRÖM, BETRAYAL AND BETRAYERS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF
TREACHERY 21 (1991).
129 GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA, at xxv (1988).
130 Id. at 2.
131 Privacy scholars have thought about and theorized harms of this type of
surveillance. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV.
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person surveillance to which Muslim-Americans have been
subjected in the aftermath of September 11. This daily,
widespread surveillance has had chilling consequences on
speech, religious practice, and many other aspects of Muslim life
in America.132 While the harms of surveillance on the communities
subjected to it are important to further understand, this article is
particularly focused on the unique harms that result from a
system that requires entire segments of a community to do the
government’s bidding.
The reality is that certain groups experience surveillance
disproportionately. Gary Marx calls this “categorical suspicion”;133
David Lyons calls it “social sorting.”134 Lyons’ social sorting theory
of informant societies posits that some groups will be intensively
targeted, and the majority of society will not feel the impact. In
this way, surveillance is not only a means of control, but also a
means of perpetuating and reinforcing differences and assigning
worth.135 But these different realities also make the majoritybased political forces less likely to intervene to protect the rights
of those most marginalized and acutely affected by these
policies. In fact, early attempts by the Bush administration in
the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks to
mandate “average citizens” and certain employees to provide
information to the government were met with severe backlash.136
Yet in Muslim communities, the expectation of becoming
informants is underway in far more aggressive and coercive
ways. This expectation of American Muslims is reflected in the
national discussion of government relationship with Muslims.
Public officials and presidential candidates’ statements
regularly express an expectation that Muslim-Americans come

1934, 1934–35 (2013); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 343–45 (2008).
132 See generally MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 18.
133 MARX, supra note 129, at 219.
134 DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 185–87 (2007) (describing
social sorting and terrorist watchlists).
135 See HEWITT, supra note 5, at 136.
136 TIPS was designed to provide “millions of American truckers, letter carriers,
train conductors, ship captains, utility employees, and others, whose routines allow them
to be the ‘eyes and ears’ of police, a formal way to report suspicious or potential terrorist
activity.” Id. at 138. The program was met with extreme backlash, from the American
Civil Liberties Union, to Republican Congressmen. Id. at 139. Congress defunded the
program fairly early on. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 880,
116 Stat. 2135, 2245 (2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 460 (2000 & Supp. III) (“Any
and all activities of the Federal Government to implement the proposed . . . Operation
TIPS . . . are hereby prohibited.”).
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forward or provide information to the government, even in the
absence of any particular knowledge that they might have.137
The potential reach of these practices, if gone unchecked,
is unlimited. While this article focuses on the No-Fly List and
the CARRP program, there is a growing use of civil, non-criminal
punitive tools across the board.138 These tools raise concerns that
similar techniques might already be proliferating in other
directions, and these may be used to coerce people to act as
informants with minimal to no oversight. The propagation of
policing theories encouraging agents to “pull levers” appears to
endorse the idea that law enforcement agents should reach their
targets by utilizing whatever tools they have at their disposal.139
B.

The Constitutionality of Coercing Informants

Coercing individuals to become informants also raises
constitutional concerns. While the case law directly speaking to
situations like Mr. Tanvir’s and Mr. Ouassif’s is thin, this is
more of a reflection of the degree of stigmatization and
marginalization of the targets rather than any dispute as to the
significant constitutional implications of such coerced
informancy.140 A case from the 1980s attests both to the
137 This approach was put on exhibit during the 2016 Presidential elections, as
both major party candidates regularly referred to Muslims as needed, or required, to
provide information. Then-candidate Donald Trump spoke to Muslims “We love
you . . . We want you to turn in the bad ones. We want you to practice vigilance. We know
that you know a lot, in many cases, we want you to turn in the bad ones.” David
Sherfinski, Donald Trump to Muslims: ‘We love you,’ ‘we want you to turn in the bad ones’
WASH. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/dec/8/donaldtrump-muslims-we-love-you-we-want-you-turn-/ [https://perma.cc/L5JD-XZGX]. Similarly,
candidate Hillary Clinton said, “[w]e need American Muslims to be part of our eyes and
ears on our front lines.” Deepti Hajela, Jeff Karoub & Noreen Nasir, U.S. Muslims Cringe
at How Presidential Nominees Portray Them, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://elections.ap.org/content/us-muslims-cringe-how-presidential-nominees-portraythem [https://perma.cc/RU74-Q9X6].
138 See Jennifer Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted,
Noncustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 335–55 (2014) (noting the
proliferation of pre-crime restraints, discussing the Specially Designated Global
Terrorist List, the No-Fly List, the Sex Offender Registries, among others, and the
related erosion of core civil liberties).
139 See David M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime
Settings, and a Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449, 449–51 (1997) (arguing that
criminal mechanisms for enforcement are insufficient at curbing repeat offenders—and
proposes an alternative of using “characteristics of chronic offenders . . . as a route
toward the control of selected dimensions of criminal behavior”).
140 Only a few civil claims have been brought by individuals who were coerced
into becoming intelligence informants. A review of civil claims brought by informants
reveals that the majority of them involve a criminal informant scenario: individuals
seeking damages for harms incurred during the course of their work. There are two
primary theories—the state-created danger doctrine, and the “special relationship”
doctrine. See Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 647–52, 654 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(A mother of a confidential informant brought a wrongful death action after her son was
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uncontroversial nature of the notion that one cannot be forced to
become an informant, as well as the challenges ahead for any
plaintiff brave enough to challenge such FBI activity. It also
serves as an important reminder of the historic precedents to
modern FBI practices: Ms. Bibi Angola, a lawyer, and a friend of
prison escapee and black liberation activist Assata Shakur, filed
suit after FBI agents, through aggressive intimidation and
harassment, attempted to force her into providing information
about Ms. Shakur. According to the complaint, FBI agents came
to her home, “terrorized her son,” threatened to damage her legal
career, and repeatedly slashed her tires. In addition, they also
questioned her friends and neighbors.141 Ms. Angola sought
injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming a violation of her
associational rights. The Second Circuit found that she had
sufficiently stated a claim, and asserted a broader anti-coercion
principle enshrined in the Constitution. The court wrote:
Every person enjoys some measure of protection against being coerced
into cooperating with law enforcement authorities by governmental
techniques of intimidation and harassment. Whether this protection
derives from the liberty interest protected by the Fifth Amendment or
the privacy interest protected by the First and Fourth Amendments
or the interest in procedural regularity protected by the Due Process
Clause is not crucial to our decision in this case.142

The court, however, underscored the rarity of this kind of
finding—that the threshold for establishing a motive to
intimidate was high, and occurrences of such improper law
enforcement motives are “infrequent.”143 Angola is among the
very few examples of civil claims brought by individuals who
were coerced into becoming intelligence informants.144
beaten to death while acting as a confidential informant. The District of Columbia
Circuit concluded that endangering the informant may violate his substantive due
process—namely an individual’s constitutional right to protection by police officers from
a state-created danger. However, this was not clearly established at the time of the
violation, and therefore the court found that the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity); see also Matican v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 2008) (there
is no special relationship between police and informant because the informant freely
agreed to serve as a confidential informant in exchange for more lenient treatment);
Vaughn v. City of Athens, 176 Fed. App’x 974, 976–78 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that
police do not have a duty to protect an informant while not in custody, despite knowledge
of threats on the informant’s life); Rich, supra note 12, at 702–03. These theories are not
applicable to the intelligence informant scenario described here. First, the informal
intelligence informant is not typically asked to engage in dangerous conduct in the same
way that an informant participating in a sting operation would be. Second, it does not
address the coercive recruitment aspect that is the focus of this piece.
141 Angola v. Civiletti, 666 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1981).
142 Id. at 3.
143 Id. at 4.
144 See Kennedy, supra note 139.
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Had the Angola court further need to elaborate, it might
have turned to the First Amendment. The First Amendment
protects against compelled speech or compelled association; in
other words, it protects the right not to speak and not to
associate.145 Refusing to work as an informant or to provide
information to the government is a form of protected speech,146
because under the compelled speech doctrine, a person may not
be compelled to express either an opinion or a fact.147 Though the
Supreme Court has prohibited compelled speech, it has not
examined the doctrine in the context of compelled informant
activities, or compulsory cooperation with law enforcement.148 In
addition to providing information, many intelligence informants
are required to engage in religious activities or attend certain
mosques; to make assertions about their faith, or their religious
or political views; to pretend to act “extremist;” to take an oath
to convert to Islam; and to make a variety of other religious or
145 See Tanvir v. Lynch, 128 F. Supp. 3d 756, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d in part
sub nom. Tanvir v. Tanzin, 889 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2018) (The four plaintiffs argued that
their refusal to become informants was a First Amendment protected activity, and that
FBI agents retaliated against them by placing or keeping them on the No-Fly List.).
146 Prisoners, however, have not generally been recognized to have a right to
not be an informant or “snitch” due to the different standard of review applicable to the
prison context. See Burns v. Martuscello, No. 9:13-CV-04, 2015 WL 541293, at *1
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2015) (a prisoner’s refusal to be a “snitch” does not amount to
protected speech under the First Amendment); Allah v. Juchenwioz, 176 F. App’x 187,
189 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that it was not clearly established that a prisoner enjoys a
constitutional right not to become an informant); Tennyson v. Rohrbacher, Civ. Action
No. 11-35, 2012 WL 366539 at *6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2012) (no circuit has held that a
prisoner enjoys a constitutional right not to become an informant); Koch v. Lewis, 96 F.
Supp. 2d 949, 966 (D. Ariz. 2000) (A prisoner challenged a prison policy granting greater
privileges if the prisoner renounced his affiliation with a prison gang and acted as an
informant. The prisoner argued that his Christian beliefs forbade his acting as an
informant. The court applied the more deferential review applicable in the prison context
and dismissed the claim.).
147 See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 797–98 (1988)
(“These [compelled speech] cases cannot be distinguished simply because they involved
compelled statements of opinion while here we deal with compelled statements of ‘fact’:
either form of compulsion burdens protected speech.”); see also Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,
356 F.3d 1277, 1284 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he First Amendment’s proscription of
compelled speech does not turn on the ideological content of the message that the speaker
is being forced to carry. The constitutional harm—and what the First Amendment
prohibits—is being forced to speak rather than to remain silent.”); Russo v. Cent. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623, 634 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting that compelled speech and compelled
silence were “constitutionally equivalent” and that “the right to remain silent in the face
of an illegitimate demand for speech is as much part of First Amendment protections as
the right to speak out in the face of an illegitimate demand for silence. . . . To compel a
person to speak what is not in his mind offends the very principles of tolerance and
understanding which for so long have been the foundation of our great land.”).
148 It is unclear whether any lower courts have either, outside of the prison
cases referenced above. See Tanvir, 128 F. Supp. 3d. at 764–65 (The district court never
reached the merits of the First Amendment arguments). The Second Circuit opinion in
Angola, discussed above, may be the only such instance. See supra note 141 and
accompanying text.
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political utterances. These activities can be likened to coerced
pledges of allegiance, which are prohibited by First Amendment
jurisprudence.149 Because of the religious overtones of informant
recruitment and activities, they also raise Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause concerns, as well as religious freedom
concerns. Indeed, some individuals have argued that being an
informant is prohibited by their Islamic faith.150 They invoked
both constitutional and statutory protection from being
compelled to do so.151 In a first, the Second Circuit upheld the
availability of a damages claim under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act152 for plaintiffs who could show that FBI agents
infringed on their religious freedom when seeking to recruit
them to inform on their communities.153
A variant of a compelled speech claim is that the type of
FBI recruitment described here often requires compulsory
disclosure of religious or political affiliations by prospective
informants to the FBI. For example, FBI agents ask individuals
to name who attends their mosque, what their political or
religious views on certain matters are, or what religious scholars
they follow. These acts infringe on the right to freedom of and
privacy in association.154 This is particularly the case when a
149 See Russo, 469 F.2d at 631 (“[T]here is no question but that the refusal to
recite the pledge and salute the flag is a form of expression, and it matters not that the
expression takes the form of silence.”). In Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), the
plaintiffs brought a suit enjoining enforcement of a New Hampshire statute which
required individuals to display the state motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plates.
The Court agreed that that statute implicated the plaintiff ’ s free speech rights by
compelling him to be “an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point
of view he finds unacceptable.” Id. at 715.
150 Three plaintiffs in Tanvir v. Lynch argued that they did not want to become
informants out of religious conviction, among other reasons. See First Amended
Complaint, supra note 2 at ¶¶ 14, 122, 157. Others have made similar assertions about
their faith, even though they have not presented this as a legal claim. See, e.g., Aaronson,
supra note 80 (A religious leader, Mr. Farahi, refused to be an informant, saying that his
motivation for not being an informant was because of the trust people had in him as a
religious leader.). Mr. Ouassif similarly noted that this would go against his religious
beliefs. Waldman, supra note 3. Claims that acting as an informant would violate
religious beliefs have not been limited to Muslim individuals. See, e.g., Rebecca Spence,
Case of Informant Reverberates Through L.A’s Orthodox Community, FORWARD (Jan. 23,
2008), https://forward.com/news/12542/case-of-informant-reverberates-through-la-s-orth01183/ [https://perma.cc/8VXU-YDWT] (noting that it goes against traditional Jewish law
to betray another Jew); see also Koch, 96 F. Supp. at 966 (inmate argues that being an
informant goes against his Christian faith).
151 Three of the four plaintiffs in Tanvir v. Lynch argued that being compelled
to act against their faith was a violation of their rights under the Religious Freedom and
Reformation Act. See Tanvir v. Tanzin, 889 F.3d 72, 80 n.5 (2d Cir. 2018).
152 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb—4 (2012)
153 Tanzin, 889 F.3d at 83.
154 Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (“Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly
where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”).
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group espouses “dissident beliefs” and there is a risk that
compelled disclosure of affiliation in such a group could expose
those members to various forms of reprisal.155 Certainly, being a
member in a religious group or a targeted population does not
necessarily make one a “dissident,” and most would probably not
self-define as such. Under dominant government theories of
radicalization,156 however, which link certain markers of
religiosity with the potential for terrorist activity, individuals
may fear being subjected to official or private reprisal for being
members of a particular group.
FBI informant recruitment practices also implicate
associational rights. A corollary of the right to associate is the
right not to associate. Many of these would-be informants are
tasked with joining certain mosques, or engaging with members
of their communities in ways that they would otherwise not
have. Thus, they are also being compelled to associate, not
simply to speak.157
From a law enforcement perspective, it has been wellestablished that coerced information presents significant
accuracy concerns.158 These are the primary sources of concern
that judges have when evaluating an informant.159 Such
concerns are just as valid in the intelligence context as the
criminal context.160 Policy arguments against coercion are,
however, beyond the scope of this article.
Id.
See Akbar, supra note 36, at 869.
157 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (holding that
state law requiring Boy Scouts to accept homosexual member was unconstitutional);
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 234–35 (1977) (holding that, because a union’s
requirement that individual members support union activities would entail the
advancement of interests and ideas that members did not share, the employee’s right not
to associate could be infringed by union laws); Elrod v. Burns 427 U.S. 347, 349 (1976)
(involving freedom of a public employee not to be forced to associate with a political party
as a condition of retaining employment).
158 See MICHAEL D. LYMAN, PRACTICAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT: PROCEDURES AND
ADMINISTRATION 132 (1989) (“[A]n informant’s motives could weigh heavily against the
officer’s safety or the credibility of the investigation.”). The range and variations in
incentives and motivations for informants have been closely scrutinized in sociological
and law enforcement literature: One such effort is Greer, supra note 10, at 509–25.
Another 1960 study by Malachi L. Harney and John C. Cross, based on American policing
experience, suggest a number of motivations: Financial reward, “the Fear Motive,”
“Revenge Motives,” “Perverse Motives,” “Egotistical Motives,” “Mercenary Motives,”
“The Detective Complex,” “Selective Law Enforcement”, “Repentance or Desire to
Reform”, “Appreciation or Gratitude Toward Police or Prosecutor”, and “Demented,
Eccentric or Nuisance Type Individuals.” HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 61, at 41–48.
159 See infra notes 205–208 and accompanying text.
160 See HEWITT, supra note 5, at 29 (noting that intelligence services, even those
operating in non-democratic societies, view coerced informers as less effective as free
informers); Ansari & Datoo, supra note 24 (quoting anonymous FBI officials concerned
that coercing intelligence informants through immigration pressures may result in bad
intelligence); see also Stabile, supra note 16, at 240–41 (arguing that informants
155
156
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THE EXISTING RESTRAINTS ON INFORMANT
RECRUITMENT

This Part describes the current administrative rules and
legal doctrines governing the use of incentives or pressure to
recruit informants. Existing rules do not adequately address the
unique problems raised by the new intelligence informant—the
“Muslim informant” practices described in Parts I and II. Where
they fail, however, the courts have also presented limited
avenues for relief.
A.

The Department of Justice Guidelines

A review of the primary sources of guidance governing
the FBI’s formal recruitment of informants yields three
observations. First, they do not distinguish informants recruited
for criminal investigation and prosecution from informants
recruited for intelligence gathering. Second, they assume a
highly formalized process for the recruitment of Confidential
Human Sources that does not correspond with the observed
reality of today’s intelligence gathering methods in Muslim
communities. Third, they are relatively silent—and therefore
permissive—on what FBI agents may or may not offer or use as
leverage to secure the cooperation of potential informants.
Beyond perfunctory acknowledgement, the standards do
not evince a serious concern for the civil liberties of a potential
informant. These deficiencies are likely due to the origins of the
guidelines, which were designed to respond to corruption, and
other pitfalls of using informants from the ranks of high-ranking
criminals.161 In particular, they arose out of a concern that
excessive or unsupervised rewards result in poor information or
intelligence.162 Further, the guidelines are reportedly violated or
sidestepped by FBI agents with impunity, suggesting that the
agencies fail to adequately assure that agents follow even the
existing rules.163
pressured through threats of deportation have more to lose, and therefore are more likely
to provide unreliable information).
161 See generally OIG Compliance Report, supra note 8; Zimmerman, supra note
23, at 99–100. To be sure, concerns about informant mishandling still exist today. See,
e.g., Dell Cameron & Patrick H. O’Neill, FBI Authorized Informants to Break the Law
22,800 Times in 4 years, DAILY DOT (Aug. 23, 2016, 4:49 PM), http://www.dailydot.com/
layer8/fbi-informants-otherwise-criminal-activity-report-foia/ [https://perma.cc/6CS6-F2QJ].
162 OIG Compliance Report, supra note 8, at 68.
163 Id. at 93 (finding major compliance deficiencies in eighty-seven percent of
reviewed informant files). The Guidelines have generally been criticized as ineffective.
See Zimmerman, supra note 23, at 133–38; David A. Harris, Law Enforcement and
Intelligence Gathering in Muslim and Immigrant Communities After 9/11, 34 N.Y.U.
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1. The Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding the
Use of FBI Confidential Human Sources164
The current Department of Justice Guidelines on
Confidential Human Sources (CHS Guidelines) were
promulgated in 2001 by Attorney General Janet Reno in
response to high profile corruption scandals in the 1990s
involving Mafia informants.165 Earlier iterations of the
guidelines were similarly triggered by a series of high-profile
incidents of corruption, of criminal conduct by informants, and
other mishandlings.166 Likely because of these origins, the
guidelines focus on reducing potential abuses by criminal
informants or corruption by agents vis-à-vis informants. They
impose documentation, reporting, and evaluation requirements
on agents who want to use or recruit an informant.167
Tellingly, there is very little in the CHS Guidelines
regulating the methods agents may use to recruit potential
informants. Despite extensive documentation requirements for
“opening” and “validating” a new source, the guidelines say little
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 164 (2010) (arguing that the FBI has abandoned the
guidelines as a way to rein in how FBI agents use informants).
164 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF FBI CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN SOURCES
(Dec. 13, 2006), http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/chs-guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RP27-MEGV] [hereinafter 2006 CHS Guidelines]; see also Dep’t of Justice Guidelines
Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 8, 2001),
https://www.justice.gov/ag/attorney-general-renos-confidential-informant-guidelinesjanuary-8-2001#prohibition [https://perma.cc/Y9VP-ZKKM]. The 2001 Guidelines were
promulgated by Janet Reno and require each agency to develop its own specific
guidelines in compliance. The 2006 CHS Guidelines are the most updated version of the
FBI’s application of the Reno Guidelines. In addition, the CHS Policy Guide expands and
elaborates on the FBI DIOG. See infra note 182.
165 OIG Compliance Report, supra note 8, at 8 (“As a result of a [two]-year
review after high-profile problems in the FBI informant program came to light in the
1990s, Attorney General Reno issued revised Confidential Informant Guidelines.”). For
the story behind the famous case of “Whitey” Bulger that drove the review, see DICK
LEHR & GERARD O’NEILL, BLACK MASS: THE IRISH MOB, THE FBI, AND A DEVIL’S DEAL (2000).
166 In 1976, Attorney General Edward Levi issued a memorandum called the
Levi Informant Guidelines. The guidelines were “intended, in part, to diminish the
perceived need for legislation to regulate and restrict the FBI’s use of informants.”
United States v. Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d 141, 190 (D. Mass. 1999). Revised guidelines
were then issued every few years by subsequent attorneys general, generally in response
to other high-profile investigations. For an account of the series of revisions under
various administrations prior to the Reno Guidelines, see OIG Compliance Report supra
note 8, at 36–55.
167 For example, the Guidelines prohibit FBI agents from interfering in the
investigation of an informant, and restrain the extent to which informants may be
permitted to engage in otherwise illegal activity. See 2006 CHS Guidelines, supra note
164, at 26, 30–40. They also prohibit the exchange of gifts or other business transactions
between DOJ personnel and informants and prohibit payments contingent on
prosecution. Id. at 27–28. They require a heightened approval process prior to utilizing
certain sensitive categories of informants, like someone who has a high rank in a
criminal organization. Id. at 17–20.
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about whether—and, if so, how—agents may incentivize their
informants; the sparse terms on this subject suggest that agents
are afforded wide discretion.
At the recruitment stage, the guidelines prohibit certain
types of transactions—again largely appearing to be animated
by concerns over corruption—but preserve broad discretion. For
example, it is clear the FBI may not promise immunity from
prosecution for any criminal activity unless explicitly authorized
to do so by the guidelines.168 The CHS Guidelines require a
formal validation process for every Confidential Human
Source.169 This process requires noting what consideration an
individual might be receiving from the government for his
assistance, or any promises or benefits provided to the individual.170
On their face, the Guidelines require agents to inform
potential informants that they cannot make “promises or
commitments . . . regarding [immigration] status . . . or the
right of any person to enter or remain in the United States.”171
Such promises or commitments, in fact, may only be made by the
United States Department of Homeland Security.172 The CHS
Guidelines also require agents to notify potential informants
that they may not follow through on promised rewards.173
Finally, agents must instruct Confidential Human Source that
their assistance or the information they provide is “entirely
voluntary.”174 These are the only provisions addressing the risk
of coercion rather than corruption. Notably, the guidelines do not
create an additional burden for an agent to ensure the
voluntariness of an informant’s cooperation, nor do the guidelines
establish any guidance on how to determine the voluntary nature
of the transaction.
This minimalist approach to interfering with the informant
negotiation process is consistent with the general proposition that
agents receive significant leeway in identifying and recruiting
informants. When faced with overwhelming incentives to recruit
informants,175 this language falls more in the category of “best
practices” rather than the imposition of a requirement.
2006 CHS Guidelines, supra note 164, at 8.
Id. at 12.
170 Id. at 13.
171 Id. at 16.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 15 (In addition, “the FBI cannot guarantee any rewards, payments, or
other compensation to the Confidential Human Source.”).
174 Id. at 14.
175 Aaronson, supra note 22 (discussing classified FBI documents recommending
that the agency increase to a minimum of five percent the number of agents dedicated
exclusively to informant recruitment).
168
169
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The FBI CHS guidelines also do not create any
enforceable rights.176 The congressional committee that was
involved in drafting an earlier version of DOJ Guidelines,
intended to regulate informant abuses, refused to make the
guidelines judicially enforceable by giving courts more power to
void a conviction when the guidelines have been violated.177
Thus, their enforcement relies solely on the FBI’s annual
performance review of special agents, when, supposedly,
possible violations are to be considered.178
The guidelines also do not distinguish between
recruitment for intelligence and recruitment for crimes. Although
some provisions distinguish investigations involving national
security, they primarily serve to reduce oversight and create a
separate process for review of those sources.179 Yet notably, even
with these relatively permissive standards and requirements,
an Inspector General review cited widespread non-compliance
with the CHS Guidelines, particularly the provisions relating to
approval, monitoring, documentation, and notification
requirements related to confidential informants.180 In sum,
nothing in the guidelines would effectively prevent an FBI agent
from employing an immigration or watchlist lever to coerce
someone to provide information to the government.181

176 2006 CHS Guidelines, supra note 164, at 11 (“Nothing in these Guidelines
is intended to create or does create an enforceable legal right or private right of action
by a Confidential Human Source or any other person.”).
177 See S. REP. NO. 97-682, at 396 (1982), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
Digitization/124269NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4CM-JSVV]. This committee was a
response to the 1980 Abscam investigations that revealed severe governmental
misconduct during undercover operations. See id. at 1–6.
178 OIG Compliance Report, supra note 8, at 124 (“[C]ompliance with these
Guidelines is considered in the annual performance appraisal of [the Law Enforcement
Agency’s] agents.”); see also United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78, 91 (1st Cir. 2000)
(holding that FBI agents lack authority to promise immunity to informants, and absent
such authority, any promise made is unenforceable).
179 See 2006 CHS Guidelines, supra note 164, at 20–22; see also infra Section IV.A.2.
180 See OIG Compliance Report, supra note 8, at 7–8.
181 See generally 2006 CHS Guidelines, supra note 164. A separate document,
the FBI’s Confidential Human Source Policy Manual does have a section on immigration,
but the heavily redacted public version makes it difficult to determine whether it
provides any additional limits on the use of immigration status for recruitment. See FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, POL07–0004–DI, CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN SOURCE POLICY
MANUAL 47–52 (2007), https://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM
003436.pdf [https://perma.cc/22JQ-XKRH].
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2. The FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations
Guide182
The FBI’s Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide
(the DIOG) is another possible source of regulation, but one that
also falls short of protecting against the abuses discussed above.
The DIOGs amount to a detailed manual governing every aspect
of an investigation, and they apply to all FBI activity. The DIOGs
elaborate and implement the Attorney General Guidelines, which
are in turn the result of the FBI’s response to the Senate
Committee’s investigation into abuses of intelligence activities
during the fifties, sixties and seventies, commonly known as the
“Church Committee.”183 Some portions of the DIOGs complement
the CHS Guidelines by providing more specifics about the
procedures for informant recruitment.
The DIOGs divide investigative activity into three levels,
each requiring varying degrees of factual predication. An
assessment is the lowest level investigation. It does not require
factual predication or a factual indication of criminal wrongdoing.
There are in turn six types of assessments, varying with respect
to their goal and authorized investigative techniques. One of
these, a “Type 5” assessment, is used when an agent determines
whether an individual is suitable to become an informant. This
assessment is performed according to the DIOG’s guidance on
identifying, evaluating, and recruiting a potential CHS. A closer
look at these requirements confirms that agents may target
someone for recruitment simply because she happens to attend a
particular mosque or belong to a particular community. According
to the DIOG, individuals with good CHS potential have
“placement and access to information or intelligence related to
criminal or national security threats or investigations.”184 They
may be identified through “database searches, surveillance of
specific locations, attendance at specific events.”185 When conducting
a Type 5 assessment, agents may investigate a particular
individual to determine whether she is suitable as a Confidential
182 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND
OPERATIONS GUIDE (2013) [hereinafter FBI DIOG], https://vault.fbi.gov/FBI%20
Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operations%20Guide%20(DIOG)
[https://
perma.cc/N2F7-VFD2].
183 The first Attorney General Guidelines were issued by Attorney General
Edward Levi in 1976, entitled “Domestic Security Investigation Guidelines.” See OIG
Compliance Report supra note 8, at 36–37.
184 FBI DIOG, supra note 182, § 5.6.3.4.1.1, at 5-21.
185 Id. In addition, the DIOGs specify that selected characteristics “may not be
based solely on race, ethnicity, national origin, religion or activities protected under the
First Amendment or a combination of only such factors.” Id. § 5.6.3.4, at 5-21.
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Human Source; they may also conduct investigations without any
specific individual in mind.
Once a potential CHS is identified and evaluated, agents
then move to the recruitment phase. In recruiting a potential
source, “information from [redacted] or other information/
intelligence available . . . may be used.”186 Presumably, agents
may draw upon the same databases used in the identification
phase. Agents may also deploy a panoply of investigative
techniques, including subjecting potential informants to a
polygraph investigation and obtaining information from other
federal agencies. As with the CHS guidelines, here, the publicly
available non-redacted versions of the DIOGs are silent on how
agents may incentivize their CHS.187
These Type 5 assessment provisions apply to those who
are being formally explored as sources of information. They do
not address the questioning that occurs on a daily basis in
Muslim-American communities under the guise of “voluntary
interviews” because such interviews are not formally considered
to be forms of informant recruitment. These interviews are
permitted at any level of investigation and require very little, if
any, factual predication. As with formal CHS recruitment, the
guidelines are virtually silent about what agents may or may not
say to a member of the public to solicit their participation in an
interview. The guidelines only specify that any information must
be provided “voluntarily,” and that “FBI employees may not
obtain a statement by force, threats, or improper promises.”188 If,
during such an interview, the interviewee indicates that she
wishes to consult an attorney, the interviewer should only
“assess whether continuing the interview would negatively
affect the voluntariness of any further information provided.”189
In order to determine whether a statement has been given
voluntarily, courts evaluate a “totality of the circumstances.”190
Beyond this, the guidelines do not provide any detail or training
on what circumstances cross the line and may render an
interview involuntary.

Id. § 5.6.3.4.1.3, at 5-22.
While the 2013 version is completely silent, the 2011 version only refers in
passing to agents’ reimbursement for expenses incurred. FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, THE DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE (2011) https://
vault.fbi.gov/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operations%20Guide%2
0%28DIOG%29/fbi-domestic-investigations-and-operations-guide-diog-2011-version
[https://perma.cc/KT5F-3G8Y] § 5.6.3.4.6, at 5-25
188 FBI DIOG § 18.5.6.1, at 18-19.
189 Id. § 18.5.6.3, at 18-19.
190 Id. at 18-20.
186

187
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As with the CHS guidelines, the DIOGs are internally
created and enforced: a violation of the DIOGs does not give rise
to an enforceable, individual cause of action. Therefore, if an FBI
agent violates the DIOGs in his or her interactions with an
individual, that alone does not enable the individual to sue the
FBI or the agent.
3. The Confidential Human Source Policy Guide191
The 2015 Confidential Human Source Policy Guide
(Guide) provides significantly more detail on the abovementioned rules with regards to the identification, recruitment,
management, and payment of confidential sources. This Guide
makes it clear that anybody can be recruited to become an
informant. It lays out in some detail how FBI agents may recruit
undocumented individuals. First, it encourages agents to collect
a “dossier” on an individual, which could include derogatory
information about the potential informant that could be used to
coerce an unwilling individual. According to the Guide, agents
have several avenues that they may pursue to incentivize
informants who do not have a legal status in the United States,
and it dedicates an entire chapter to immigration-related
incentives. These include the “Significant Public Benefit Parole
Program,” Deferred Action Program, Advance Parole, S-Visa, or
the option to even provide a permanent residency status to a
limited number of Confidential Human Sources.192 Significantly,
once the person is no longer of value to the FBI, the handling
agent must work with immigration authorities to locate and
remove them.193
B.

The Limits of Judicial Oversight and Remedies
1. Judicial Oversight Through the Criminal Process

There are few judicial restraints on the FBI’s ability to
coerce individuals to become informants. To the limited extent
191 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (U)0836PG, CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN
SOURCE POLICY GUIDE (Sept. 21, 2015), https://archive.org/details/ConfidentialHuman
SourcePolicyGuide [https://perma.cc/5KGU-327Q]
192 Id. at 63–74.
193 Id. at 63 (“If any illegal alien CHS is determined to be unreliable or no longer
suitable for use by as a CHS, the CA must close him or her and notify the [REDACTED]
in writing of the individual’s status and location. The [REDACTED] must notify ICE
headquarters to terminate the CHS’s adjustment of status, as appropriate. The CA must
also notify the local ICE office of the CHS’s status and location. If the CHS’s location is
unknown, the CA must work with ICE to locate the individual.”).
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such restraints are available, they are inherent to the criminal
justice process and therefore inapplicable to the intelligence
informant. Whatever limited judicial oversight over informant
recruitment exists comes through courts’ presiding over warrant
requests, witnesses, trials, or plea deals.194 This check on
coercion is of minimal use if, as in the intelligence context, an
informant’s activities are not intended to yield criminal
prosecutions. Accordingly, the FBI’s activities vis-à-vis
intelligence informants remain largely outside the purview of
the judiciary.
Most judicial opportunities for oversight of the informant
recruitment process involve criminal informants, and are, in any
case, offered limited restraints. As a baseline, the exploitation of
informants’ vulnerabilities in the criminal process is widely
tolerated.195 The mere ability to decline to arrest an individual196
gives agents significant power to wield in their quest for
information from someone over whom they have probably cause
to believe is involved in some wrongdoing. Prosecutors enjoy
similar discretion, and their charging decisions are virtually
unreviewable by courts,197 subject only to constitutional
constraints.198 Courts have supported this discretionary
authority—for example, by finding that consent by an informant
is valid even if obtained under threat of prosecution, or with a

194 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(C)(3)–(5). The adequacy of the plea-bargaining process
in ensuring voluntary and knowing pleas has been questioned. See, e.g., Daniel S.
McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61 (2015).
195 See Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329 F.3d 912, 917–18 (7th Cir. 2003). While the
Seventh Circuit allowed the plaintiff ’ s Section 1983 claim to go forward because of the
level of deceit employed by prosecutors to obtain her consent to become an informer, it
embraced the general practice of informant recruitment in exchange for leniency.

[W]e cannot think of any reason, especially any reason rooted in constitutional
text or doctrine, for creating a categorical prohibition against the informant’s
incurring [costs such as] the usual risk of being beaten up or for that matter
bumped off by a drug dealer . . . in the hope of obtaining lenient treatment from
the government.
Id. at 918; see also supra notes 123–130.
196 See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (no cause of action
against police who failed to enforce a domestic violence restraining order); see also Joseph
Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions
in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L. J. 543, 543 (1960).
197 See generally Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996).
198 A prosecutor’s discretion is subject to constitutional constraints. See United
States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979). Such constraints include charging decisions
based on an impermissible basis. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464
(1996) (Equal Protection Clause prohibits decision to prosecute based on an unjustifiable
standard such as race or religion); Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 30–31 (1984) (violations
of due process give rise to a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness).
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promise for immunity.199 Similarly, a criminal defendant against
whom there is probable cause may be prosecuted after refusing
to cooperate, and does not have a civil remedy to address
coercion through a malicious prosecution claim200 or a selective
prosecution defense.201
Thus, when negotiating with informants, prosecutors
have near-complete latitude.202 A charging decision based on
willingness to become an informant is not only accepted, but
built into sentencing guidelines and procedures. By legislative
design, service as an informant plays a powerful role during
sentencing in the federal system.203 The widespread acceptance
of the use of some coercion against prospective criminal
defendants means that courts generally do not scrutinize the
informant-handler relationship.204
When courts do inquire into an informant’s motives or the
circumstances of the informant deal, the driving interest is in
assessing the reliability of the evidence obtained, and also avoiding
tainting of any evidence.205 Neither of these considerations is
applicable in the intelligence context when a criminal prosecution
or trial is not envisioned. For instance, when inquiring into
199 United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213, 229 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S.
823 (1973) (rejecting argument that consent was not voluntary because it was extended
under the threat of a potential indictment); see also United States v. Horton, 601 F.2d
319, 322 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Silva, 449 F.2d 145, 146 (1st Cir. 1971), cert.
denied 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Good v. United States, 378 F.2d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 1967).
200 In Labensky v. Rozzi, No. 98-7512, 1999 WL 146292, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 15,
1999), a plaintiff brought malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and retaliation claims
after being arrested on valid drug charges by officers who were seeking her help in
infiltrating a gang. When she vacillated, she was eventually indicted for the drug
offenses. The Second Circuit found “refusal to cooperate with the government is not
constitutionally protected conduct in this context.” (emphasis added). Id. at *2.
201 See United States v. Ross, 719 F.2d 615, 620 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Where there is
probable cause for believing a defendant has committed a crime, his prosecution is not
constitutionally barred because the prosecutor’s selection of his, out of many other
possible crimes to pursue, was precipitated by defendant’s failure to cooperate with law
enforcement officials.”).
202 See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1298–99 (10th Cir. 1999)
(federal statute prohibiting bribery does not apply to a prosecutor negotiating a plea
agreement or recruiting an informant). In Singleton, the court described leniency for
testimony as an “ingrained aspect of American legal culture.” Id. at 1302.
203 See NATAPOFF, supra note 12, at 50, 54. For example, The U.S. Federal
Sentencing Guidelines allow the government to seek a sentence below the mandatory
minimum by filing a motion “stating that the defendant has provided substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense.” Id. at 52 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2008). These provisions are used prolifically. There are similar
provisions in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which permit courts to reduce
sentences after they have been set as a reward for cooperation. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35.
204 See Zimmerman, supra note 23, at 129.
205 See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (“[A]n informant’s
‘veracity’, ‘reliability,’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ are all highly relevant in determining the
value of his report.”).
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whether an informant’s tip can provide probable cause, courts
are instructed to look at the veracity or reliability of an
informant’s information. Among the factors considered to
establish reliability are the informant’s motives, such as personal
animus against a defendant,206 prior criminal record, or any quidpro-quo by authorities.207 Relatedly, informants who are “citizens”
or bystanders with no apparent motive to falsify are viewed by
courts as inherently more reliable.208
2. Limited Civil Remedies
Beyond the protections inherent to the criminal process,
constitutional violations should be remediable through affirmative
civil litigation.209 However, civil suits against FBI agents based
206 United States v. Stout, 641 F. Supp. 1074, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant to search the defendant’s residence was not
established, in part because the officer-affiant had at least recklessly omitted the fact
that the confidential informant was the husband of the woman whom the informant
claimed was living with the defendant and involved with him in a major drugdistribution network).
207 See, e.g., United States v. Huggins, 299 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting defendants’ contention that the failure to disclose in the application for a
search warrant that the confidential informant was in custody and trying to secure a
plea bargain was a material omission that justified suppression, noting that although
the confidential informant was being prosecuted for a felony and was cooperating with
the authorities in the hope of obtaining leniency, the informant’s information was
firsthand and corroborated by the police); United States v. Gambino, No. 88-1030, 1988
WL 132594, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 2, 1988); United States v. Estrada, 733 F.2d 683, 684,
686 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that although the informant agreed to provide information
in return for the officer’s promise to write the sentencing judge in a state prosecution,
the informant’s information implicating the defendants was against penal interest, was
detailed, and was partially corroborated by the police). But see United States v. MedinaReyes, 877 F. Supp. 468, 475 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (No probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant to search the defendants’ residence, in part because the informant’s unique
cooperation agreement with the authorities provided that the informant would receive a
specified lenient sentence only if the informant provided the authorities with a
prosecutable case against two of the defendants within a specified period of time.
Notwithstanding that the informant provided firsthand, corroborated information about
the defendants’ drug trafficking, the court concluded that probable cause was not
established when the unique nature of the cooperation agreement was combined with the
omission of significant facts from, and the inclusion of false information in, the affidavit).
208 In Jaben v. United States, the justices compared narcotics informants to
civilian sources in a tax evasion case who were “much less likely to produce false or
untrustworthy information.” Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 224 (1965). Courts
regularly assume that a witness or bystander is more trustworthy than an informant
recruited through the criminal process. See, e.g., Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395
(2d Cir. 2006) (“[I]nformation provided by ‘an identified bystander with no apparent
motive to falsify has a peculiar likelihood of accuracy.’”) (quoting Caldarola v. Calabrese,
298 F.3d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 2002)). For some critiques of the citizen-informant doctrine,
see Ariel C. Werner What’s in a Name? Challenging the Citizen-Informant Doctrine 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2336, 2360–73 (2014).
209 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (“When government officials
abuse their offices, ‘action[s] for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication
of constitutional guarantees.’”) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)).
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on constitutional violations—known as Bivens210 actions and
which are the judicially-created federal analog to a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 remedy—face several challenges. To bring a Bivens claim,
a plaintiff has to show that there is no “alternative, existing
process” for protecting the coerced individual’s interests, and, if
the court finds the specifics of that case to be a new context for
a Bivens action, that there are no “special factors” that
“counsel[ ] hesitation” in providing a remedy.211 Bivens suits
brought by plaintiffs making allegations of constitutional
violations in the context of counterterrorism operations have
generally encountered government opposition on the grounds that
such a suit would implicate national security.212 Recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence has further circumscribed the availability
of Bivens remedies.213 In the case of Mr. Tanvir and his coplaintiffs who had religious objections to becoming informants,
the Second Circuit recognized the availability of a damages
action against the FBI agents under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.214 However, even if a court recognized the
availability of a damages action against FBI agents, a plaintiff
who successfully establishes a constitutional or statutory
violation would still have to overcome the significant hurdle of
qualified immunity afforded to FBI agents.215
V.

FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS OF REFORM PROPOSALS

Criminal justice scholars have raised a number of
constitutional and policy-based concerns regarding the coercive
210 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 390–97 (1971) (holding that a civil remedy is available for injuries resulting from
federal agents’ violation of the Fourth Amendment).
211 Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007).
212 See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 573 (2d Cir. 2009) (extraordinary
rendition of terrorism suspect). In Tanvir, the defendants raised the Bivens “special
factors” argument. See Memorandum of Law in Support of the Individual Agent
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint at 18, Tanvir v. Lynch, 128
F. Supp. 3d 756 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d in part sub nom. Tanvir v. Tanzin, 889 F.3d 72
(2d Cir. 2018) (No. 1:13-CV-06951-RA), ECF No. 39. https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/
files/assets/Tanvir%20%E2%80%93%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss%20Individual%20C
apacity%20Defendants%E2%80%99%20Claims.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TN6-TEGJ].
213 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.
1843 (2017).
214 Tanvir v. Tanzin, 889 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2018).
215 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (government officials
performing discretionary functions are immune unless they violate “clearly established”
rights and if “a reasonable person would have known” of that violation); see also
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (applying the qualified immunity
analysis to FBI agents). The Supreme Court has suggested that qualified immunity sets
a fairly high bar for plaintiffs, describing it as protecting “all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

1218

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:4

aspects of the criminal informant-handler relationship,
including at recruitment.216 They have also articulated proposals
to reduce the harms inherent to informant coercion practices.217
Some have sought to prohibit the leveraging of criminal
sanctions altogether.218 None of these proposals, however, would
adequately protect intelligence informants.
A.

Existing Reform Proposals

Reform proposals to date have sought to elevate the
protections that are embedded in the criminal justice system.
They seek to capitalize on the prospect of cross-examination, the
possibility of judicial oversight over warrants, the promise of
competent access to counsel, and the self-regulation of agents
fearful of tainting their case.219 Procedural protections inherent
to the criminal justice system are generally presumed to
function as safeguards from various forms of law enforcement
abuse. In the case of coercive informant recruitment, the
rationale is that a defendant can choose to avail herself of an
alternate, meaningful process if she chooses not to cooperate,

216 See Zimmerman, supra note 23. See generally Susan S. Kuo, Official
Indiscretions: Considering Sex Bargains with Government Informants 38 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1643 (2005) (questioning the soundness of an arrestee’s “consent” when law
enforcement coerces her into engaging in a sexual act in exchange for avoiding
prosecution, arguing that special measures should be taken to ensure valid consent for
informants undertaking sex acts); Daniel Moore, Comment, Protecting Alien-Informants:
The State-Created Danger Theory, Plenary Power Doctrine, and International Drug
Cartels, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 295, 319–23 (2007) (discussing the “state created danger”
theory as a defense in deportation proceedings of aliens who acted as U.S. government
informants); Rich, supra note 12 (invoking the Thirteenth Amendment and limitations
on involuntary servitude to reform the practice of coercing informants in exchange for
leniency in the criminal process). The problem of coerced informants has also received
significant attention following publicized incidents of informants being harmed while
they work. See, e.g., Sarah Stillman, The Throwaways, NEW YORKER (Sept. 3, 2012),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/09/03/the-throwaways [https://perma.cc/W6HMKPQS].
217 See NATAPOFF, supra note 12, at 140–41.
218 See Rich, supra note 12, at 728. Professor Rich carves out three exceptions
to his general proposed prohibition of informant recruitment of defendants or suspects:
First, it may be permissible if the goal is to obtain information already in the informant’s
possession; second, officers may appeal to different motives, like pay or civic duty. Id.
Otherwise, he argues that recruitment after conviction at trial or after a negotiated plea
agreement would be permissible. Id. at 729.
219 For a comparative perspective that highlights how the American system
centralizes the transparency potential of the open courtroom and criminal trial as it
relates to undercover operations relative to the German system which maintains secrecy
of those operations throughout, see Jacqueline Ross, The Place of Covert Surveillance in
Democratic Societies: A Comparative Study of the United States and Germany, 55 AM. J.
COMP. L. 493, 506 (2007).
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and so she has a real choice, even if her options are not ideal.220
From this perspective, abuses or mistakes can be caught or
mitigated through robust judicial oversight or competent legal
representation at every stage of the criminal process.
These protections are most prominently on exhibit in the
five-star version of the criminal justice system. In her seminal
book on criminal informants, Professor Alexandra Natapoff
proposes that there is a “rich man’s version of the informant
experience.”221 This version—say in the mafia or white-collar
crime context—is characterized by greater formality, regulation,
and oversight.222 An informant deal negotiated between defense
counsel and the prosecutor affords some—although limited—
protections to the recruit and, as the criminal justice system
generally reflects political and social realities, those protections
are more available to rich defendants.223 As a result, Natapoff
has called for an expansion of these protections to “street
criminals” being coerced through the criminal process—largely
through extending some of the same protections accorded to the
“rich informant” to the “poor informant.”224
A central pillar of these existing reform efforts involves
increasing access to counsel for prospective criminal informants
to negotiate the terms of possible cooperation. These proposals
proceed on the theory that counsel would assist an individual
with evaluating the risks and benefits of a prospective informant
deal.225 In the criminal context, access to counsel would control
agents’ ability to misrepresent the nature of the allegations, as
well as the certainty of prosecution, and to help targets better
assess their options ahead of reaching a cooperation agreement

220 Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal
Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 153 (1999) (noting that during the plea-bargaining
process, “the defendant is free to proceed without the prosecutor’s concession”).
221 NATAPOFF, supra note 12, at 140 (quoting MARX, supra note 129, at 8).
222 See id.
223 See generally King, supra note 220 (discussing judicial tolerance—if not
approval—of free trade in constitutional or statutory rights that occurs during the plea
bargaining, sentencing agreements, and other stages in the criminal process). For a thorough
analysis of the disparate treatment the criminal justice system provides according to race and
class, see David Cole, No Equal Justice 1 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 19 (2001).
224 NATAPOFF, supra note 12, at 140–41.
225 Professor Natapoff proposes increased access to counsel, but recognizes this
would severely limit the ability to recruit informants in the more routine dynamics between
police and suspects in street and drug crime policing. NATAPOFF, supra note 12, at 183–84;
see also Kuo, supra note 216, at 1679 (suggesting access to counsel and judicial oversight
during plea bargaining or negotiation of informant deal involving a sex act is necessary).
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or agreeing to become informants.226 Legislative reforms pushed
by advocates have had a similar focus on access to counsel.227
These proposals are, however, tethered to the principle
that existing criminal procedure provides a framework for
minimizing harm. Yet this article has illustrated how a
significant area of FBI activity exists outside of the criminal
process altogether. For example, access to counsel in the
immigration and watchlisting context provides only marginal
benefits.228 Nor is judicial review through the criminal process a
possibility, as intelligence informants are rarely tasked with
obtaining the type of information intended to make it to judicial
review. Thus, Muslim intelligence informants fall through the
cracks of existing safety nets. Individuals like Mr. Tanvir and
Mr. Ouassif remain unprotected even if the most protective
reform proposals are implemented.229 Intelligence informant
recruitment should be separately addressed, although that
inquiry can be informed by the criminal informant context.
B.

Towards an Intelligence Informant Paradigm

A federal judge who has closely monitored the evolution
of law enforcement intelligence gathering practices over decades
noted an evolution in the targets of surveillance—over time,
various communities will find themselves in the crosshairs of
law enforcement scrutiny.230 The rules and protections must
evolve accordingly as the methods and targets evolve. Today,
those targets have expanded to include Arab, Muslim and South
226 In the case of Rachel Hoffman, Ms. Hoffman was misled by officers into
thinking she was facing criminal charges far more severe than she could possibly face.
Thus, access to an attorney ahead of that agreement would likely have mitigated the
coercion and led her to make to a more informed decision. See Stillman, supra note 216.
227 FLA STAT. ANN. § 914.28(3)(c), also known as “Rachel’s law,” requires that “a
person who is requested to serve as a confidential informant [be given] the opportunity
to consult with legal counsel.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 914.28(3)(c). A New York Bill to amend
the state criminal procedure law in relation to the regulation of the use of informants
proposed a similar access to counsel provision. See 2007 New York Assembly Bill No.
1124, New York Two Hundred Thirtieth Legislative Session
228 See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text regarding mandamus and
minimal avenues for relief for CARRP holds. See supra Section II.C. for the limited role
an attorney can play given the existing listing and de-listing process for the No-Fly List.
229 Some consideration has been given to individuals recruited outside the
criminal process and through the S-1 visa, sometimes called the “snitch visa.” See Stabile,
supra note 16, at 268.
230 Judge Haight’s opinion in Handschu v. Police Dep’t of the City of New York
was addressing the evolution of the NYPD’s surveillance program over the several
decades that he has presided over a class action law suit challenging police surveillance
of political activities. “[I]t is an historical fact that as the decades passed, one group or
another came to be targeted by police.” The members of the class in that case are all
individuals and organizations residing in or operating in New York City. Handschu v.
Police Dep’t of the City of New York, 219 F. Supp. 3d 388, 404 (S.D.N.Y 2016).
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Asian communities, and the methods have evolved to include
non-criminal ones. Yet judicial and regulatory oversight has
fallen behind—despite the significant liberties at stake.
This gap in regulation exists because the current
recruitment practices are unprecedented in scale: widespread
recruitment of non-criminal informants for intelligence purposes
in the United States is arguably a new, post-September 11
development. Even the most prominent historical precedents of
widespread infiltration of and informant recruitment among
political groups in the United States reveal that those
informants tended to be recruited through the criminal
process.231 And this is not unique to the United States: authoritarian
regimes that relied heavily on recruiting a large number of
informants still often did so after arrest and confession.232
In targeting Muslim informants outside of the criminal
process, FBI agents have been able to take advantage of this gap
in regulation and oversight. They have capitalized on their
increasingly discretionary investigative tools with a near total
absence of review of their informant recruitment practices. The
situation described in this article results in a perverse incentive
structure for the agent: as long as investigations do not yield a
prosecution, FBI agents can insulate their informantrecruitment practices from judicial scrutiny. And as long as they
do not formally recruit informants, FBI agents can evade even
internal oversight by their supervisors and in their annual
reviews per the FBI’s administrative guidelines.
VI.

SOME PROPOSALS

Strengthened procedural protections in the context of the
CARRP program or the No-Fly List will reduce the discretion
afforded to individual FBI agents—a necessary step to prevent
their abuse. Improvement of these protections has been the
primary goal of litigation efforts challenging the No-Fly List.233
The CARRP program has similarly been challenged in federal
231 In his study of twenty-one cases involving informants involved in infiltrating
social movements in the 1970s, Gary Marx observed that a large percentage were either
formerly, or simultaneously informants for “traditional” criminal matters. He noted that
this was prominent in the black movement, because “some groups such as the Panthers
and Black Muslims sought to recruit from those with lower class and criminal
backgrounds. Legal protest and illegal drugs were part of the same youth culture.” See
Gary T. Marx, Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant: The
Agent Provocateur and the Informant, 80 AM. J. OF SOC. 402, 411 (1974).
232 See Greer, supra note 10, at 516.
233 See, e.g., Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1161 (D. Or. 2014) (describing
existing procedures as “wholly ineffective” and requiring the development of new,
constitutionally adequate procedures).
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court, although those cases have generally been resolved before
reaching the merits.234 However, such improvements do not
address the core problem raised by the growing practice of
coercing informants. Indeed, it is likely that these tools will
remain at FBI agents’ disposal in some capacity, as the use of
databases proliferates as a central component of counterterrorism
efforts, as immigration enforcement remains a national law
enforcement priority, and as agents continue to be incentivized to
gather informants. Thus, the regulatory framework should be
amended to strengthen prohibitions on the coercion of individuals
to provide information to law enforcement. As discussed in Part
III, the governing guidelines and regulatory schemes do not
include robust anti-coercion principles, are unenforceable, and
are unlikely to meaningfully alter agents’ behavior. This is
especially true in light of countervailing pressures to recruit
informants. Revisions along the following principles would
strengthen the protections available to individuals like Mr.
Ouassif and Mr. Tanvir, and everyone else who might be
deemed—at one point or another—to belong to a social, political
or religious network or group that finds itself in the crosshairs
of law enforcement attention.
A.

Guaranteeing Consent

The DIOGs and the CHS guidelines should be
strengthened to emphasize the voluntariness requirement. This
can be achieved in a number of ways. For example, the
guidelines can be amended to include a step at the outset of the
interaction requiring FBI agents to execute the equivalent of a
Miranda warning—a law-enforcement delivery of notice of
rights—to any member of the public that they seek to recruit as
an informant, or from whom they wish to obtain information.
That warning should inform the potential informant that
providing information to the government is voluntary, and that
no negative consequences can follow from refusal. If applicable,
the agents should also explicitly say that the outcome of pending
immigration-related applications do not turn on cooperation.
In addition, when an agent obtains information from a
member of the public, he or she should be required to note the
234 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4, Muhanna v.
USCIS, No. 2:14-CV-05995, 2014 WL 3747595 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2014), ECF No. 1 (filed
but withdrawn without prejudice after the government acted on Plaintiffs’ applications).
A similar outcome appears to have unfolded in Alwan v USCIS. See Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Petitions for Naturalization, Alwan v. USCIS, No.
4:16-CV-00692 (dismissed E.D. Mo. Aug. 24,, 2017), ECF No. 1.

2018]

A NATION OF INFORMANTS

1223

circumstances under which the agent has obtained consent, with
enough detail that would enable a reviewer to meaningfully
assess the voluntariness of the encounter. Such a notation
should be included in the formal summary of the interview.
Through adding such a requirement, the agency would
communicate to FBI agents that it is institutionally committed
to ensuring that purportedly voluntary informants are in fact
volunteers. Moreover, the mere prospect of having to detail the
circumstances may act as a deterrent for abuse.235
It is worth acknowledging that the voluntariness of
consent in an inherently coercive situation has long been
questioned by scholars and police reform advocates.236 Proposals
to require “consent forms” to ensure that officers have obtained
appropriate consent ahead of a search have also had mixed
results.237 Indeed, the instruction of rights does not
automatically result in meaningful consent and it would likely
present similar caution in this context, where the interaction
between agents and members of the public—particularly
vulnerable immigrants—is inherently coercive.
Finally, it would be important to add these proposed
requirements to all types of assessments, and not just the “Type
5” assessment. This would prevent agents from circumventing
the protections by further de-formalizing their engagement with
potential intelligence informants. Such clarity in motivation is
also a best practice, as it will also allow one reviewing an
informant’s intelligence to assess accuracy.238
B.

Enforcement & Oversight

Improving the prohibitions on coercing individuals is
meaningless if there is no structure to ensure that the rules are
235 Research in the context of the use of force has shown that police departments
that have reporting requirements can reduce police killings significantly. See, e.g., Jay
T. Jennings & Meghan E. Rubado, Want to Reduce Fatal Police Shootings? This Policy
Makes a Big Difference, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/14/want-to-reduce-fatal-police-shootings-this-policy-makes-abig-difference/?utm_term=.b696c46423f2 [https://perma.cc/KL4F-WAU7].
236 See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
211, 211–12 (2002).
237 See Nancy Leong & Kira Suyeishi, Consent Forms and Consent Formalism, 2013
WIS. L. REV. 751, 751, 782 (2013).
238 See DENNIS G. FITZGERALD, INFORMANTS, COOPERATING WITNESSES, AND
UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LAW, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE 24
(2d ed. 2015) (“[C]larity in terms used to identify the various types of cooperators is
essential. . . . lack of precision will also allow those case officers who, for various reasons
including motives of impropriety, do not wish to register a person as an informant, a way
out of the registration process by claiming that the person did not come within the
definition.”).
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followed, or if violations are not addressed in a meaningful way.
Oversight of FBI agents’ recruitment activities can be
accomplished in several ways. Scholars have noted the powerful
potential of Inspector General offices in protecting individual
liberties, particularly in the national security setting where
judicial review is often limited.239 The Department of Justice’s
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has already conducted
extensive investigations into the FBI’s confidential human
source practices, noting significant compliance deficiencies.240
Among the office’s detailed recommendations have been the
implementation of compliance plans, technical support, training
and adjustment to personnel and performance plans, to name a
few.241 These recommendations were all primarily geared
towards addressing the main problems at issue at the time—
confidential informants who were participating in criminal
activity.242 An OIG review of informant recruitment practices
with an eye towards overseeing the abuse of authority for
informant recruitment purposes might similarly yield strong
recommendations and deterrent effect.
Congressional oversight might also be considered.
During 1983 and 1984, Congress considered the Undercover
Operations Act, which would have required the Attorney
General to promulgate Guidelines for undercover operations and
subject them to congressional supervision. This act would have
created a cause of action for a violation of any civil rights
resulting from an undercover operation. The bill was never
brought to a vote.243 If it could be passed, legislation giving a
right of action to someone who was threatened, blackmailed, or
otherwise coerced into providing information to the federal
government would serve a significant deterrent effect.

239 Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and
National Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1027–28 (2013).
240 See OIG Compliance Report, supra note 8, at 93–94.
241 Id. at 133–34.
242 See supra notes 164–166.
243 See Undercover Operations Act: Hearing on S. 804 Before the Subcomm. on
Crim. L. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 8 (1984) https://babel.hathitrust.org/
cgi/pt?id=pur1.32754075297253;view=1up;seq=14 [https://perma.cc/8Q6C-FPWX]; see also
Undercover Operations Act, S. 804, 98th Cong. § 3803 (1984) (proposed bill concerned with
the rights of those who are being targeted by undercover operations, rather than the
rights of those being coerced to become informants themselves).
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Segregating the Intelligence Informant Recruitment
Functions

The FBI functions as a federal police force as well as a
domestic spy agency.244 This dual role is fairly unique: a
comparative look at European states that have had longer
histories with totalitarian regimes sheds some light on
alternative approaches. In the United States, there is no
institutional, regulatory or legal distinction between the recruitment
of informants in the intelligence and the criminal contexts.
Elsewhere, in societies that have had a longer history of dealing with
repressive regimes, regulations have evolved to distinguish
undercover police operations used for intelligence gathering from
undercover operations aimed at gathering evidence.245
The FBI’s procedures for informant recruitment should
similarly be revised to differentiate between informants who are
being recruited for intelligence gathering and those recruited for
criminal investigations, applying heightened protections to the
recruitment of intelligence sources.246 The current CHS
guidelines create a special review procedure for recruitment of
certain types of human sources.247 There are other special
procedures outlined for different types of informants, including
probationers, parolees, or prisoners.248 Ironically, a sensitive
source involved in a national security investigation is exempt
244 Robert S. Mueller III, The FBI’s New Mission: Preventing Terrorist Attacks
While Protecting Civil Liberties, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 117, 120–22 (2003).
245 See, e.g., Ross, supra note 219, at 521–29 (comparing the German rules on
undercover policing to American ones, noting that the German system has a much more
deliberate distinction between intelligence gathering and evidence gathering,
“preventative” and “repressive” functions of police work, and generally imposes higher
constraints on undercover operations, likely in reaction to the memories of intensive
surveillance under the German Democratic Republic); see also id. at 503 n.22–24
(describing a core distinction in German legal doctrine and of separation between police
and intelligence agencies, a principle that solidified in response to the Gestapo experience).
246 There are precedents for such a differentiation: for example, different
warrant requirements currently exist for a wiretap for criminal investigation and a
wiretap for foreign intelligence gathering—with looser requirements for a foreign
intelligence investigation. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was enacted
after congressional inquiries revealing widespread monitoring of political activities.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1863 (2012)). It required a warrant process for
intelligence gathering purposes—civil liberties advocates were, at the time, proponents
of creating this procedure because the alternative was no regulation. See Peter P. Swire,
The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1309
(2004) (describing the origins of the FISA statute as a compromise between civil liberties
advocates and supporters of surveillance, and the differences in procedural rules as
applied to foreign versus domestic surveillance).
247 These “sensitive” sources include “Senior Leadership” source, a “Privileged or
Media” source, a “High-Level Government or Union” source, or a source that has been registered
for more than five consecutive years. 2006 CHS Guidelines, supra note 164, at 17–18.
248 Id. at 23–24.
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from these special oversight procedures, and has separate, even
less transparent ones.249 An opposite approach would be more
appropriate, given the problem of coerced intelligence
informants: recruitment of informants in the intelligence context
should be viewed as more sensitive than the recruitment of other
types of informants, and subjected to special review procedures.
CONCLUSION
This article has highlighted a significant area of
counterterrorism policing: the push to turn entire communities
into sources of information for the government. In repurposing
a growing range of non-criminal levers to support their efforts to
turn informants, FBI agents are engaging in a practice that is
evocative of a totalitarian state and infringes on fundamental
freedoms. Yet, because these levers fall outside the criminal
process, existing legal and institutional protections do not
prevent abuses. This article has ended with some specific
recommendations that would begin to mitigate the individual,
communal, and broader societal harms that result from the
targeting of individuals for their associational identity and
coercing them to become informants. However, “[b]ecause
informant use and its problems are rooted in so many different
social institutions, they cannot be fixed solely by changing legal
rules.”250 The entrenchment of widespread, quotidian
intelligence gathering from law abiding citizens requires further
exposure and interrogation by scholars and policymakers alike.

249 Id. at 20 (“No Confidential Human Source who is providing information for
use in international terrorism investigations, national security investigations, or other
activities under NSIG shall be referred to the HSRC for review. Instead, the FBI shall
provide notice to the National Security Division within 60 days of FBI Headquarters’
approval of the continued use of any such Confidential Human Source who is subject to
enhanced review provisions of the FBI’s Confidential Human Source Validation
Standards Manual.”).
250 NATAPOFF, supra note 12, at 175.

